University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Open Access Theses & Dissertations
2020-01-01

Abstraction Techniques In Security Games With Underlying
Network Structure
Anjon Basak
University of Texas at El Paso

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/open_etd
Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons

Recommended Citation
Basak, Anjon, "Abstraction Techniques In Security Games With Underlying Network Structure" (2020).
Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 2930.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/open_etd/2930

This is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open
Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information,
please contact lweber@utep.edu.

ABSTRACTION TECHNIQUES IN SECURITY GAMES WITH UNDERLYING
NETWORK STRUCTURE

ANJON BASAK

Doctoral Program in Computer Science

APPROVED:

Christopher Kiekintveldt, Ph.D. Chair

Martine Ceberio, Ph.D.

Deepak Tosh, Ph.D.

Charles Kamhoua, Ph.D.

Stephen Crites, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

c Copyright
by
Anjon Basak
2020

To My
Mother
With Love

ABSTRACTION TECHNIQUES IN SECURITY GAMES WITH UNDERLYING
NETWORK STRUCTURE

by

ANJON BASAK

DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Doctoral Program in Computer Science
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
May 2020

Abstract
In a multi-agent system, multiple intelligent agents interact with each other in an environment to achieve their objectives. They can do this because they know which actions are
available to them and which actions they prefer to take in a particular situation. The job
of game theory is to analyze the interactions of the intelligent agents by different solution
techniques and provide analysis such as predicting outcomes or recommending courses of
action to specific players. To do so game theory works with a model of real-world scenarios
which helps us to make a better decision in our already complex daily life. Game theory also
has a growing role in protecting us and our infrastructure, as well as protecting wildlife from
crimes. In this thesis, I particularly focus on adversarial game theoretic models where the
interacting agents’ decision space involves network structure both in the physical domain
and cyber domain. In this type of game model, the strategy space is typically represented
by a network with interconnected nodes representing valuable entities that the defender
wants to protect from the adversaries.
However, due to the underlying network structure, the decision space of the interacting
agents increases exponentially in the representation size of the game. This makes analyzing
the game models almost intractable due to the limitation of computational resources. Despite the state of the art in hardware where the processing power is becoming faster, this is
not sufficient to scale in exponential spaces where we have limited computational resources.
In fact, the majority of people do not have access to the state of the art processing power
which is also very expensive. A common way to utilize the best available resource is using
a smaller, abstracted model of a larger model that can be analyzed within a feasible time
duration. Doing so is not straightforward since we can lose overall quality. In this thesis,
I particularly try to exploit the pattern, characteristics, and structure of the underlying
network of a game-theoretic model to make algorithmic analysis scalable.
My first project is on Green Security Games that focuses particularly on the problem
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of protecting wildlife and natural resources against illegal exploitation, such as poaching
and illegal logging. The illegal activities can be prevented by patrolling the important
areas using patrollers by following a particular route. The game model has an underlying
network structure to capture the physical terrain. However, the graph representation entails
a huge number of possible patrolling paths which grows exponentially with the size of the
graph and it creates a computational challenge for the decision makers to find an optimal
patrolling strategy. In this scenario, the poaching tends to happen more where there are
high animal activities which create sparseness in the network. I present an algorithm that
exploits the sparseness characteristic of the underlying network of the terrain to create a
smaller representation which can be handled easily to compute the optimal strategy for the
decision makers. The experiments show significant improvement over the base algorithms.
Next, I use a game-theoretic model based on a cyber defense scenario where a botnet
spreads through the network and a network admin tries to increase the security of the
network to stop that botnet. The network admin has limited resources. On top of that,
a real-world network can have a huge number of machines which makes it difficult for
the network admin computationally to allocate his limited resources for increasing the
security of the network. However, most real-world networks are divided into subnets to
increase performance and security. Botnets often spread easily within a subnet using worms
that exploit existing vulnerabilities, but spreading between subnets is harder compared
to intra-subnet due to existing security and monitoring. This locality leads to a game
model with a particular structure that can be solved by decomposing the game into smaller
games. I present an algorithm that utilizes this subnet structure in a network to achieve a
highly scalable game model. The experiments show that using network decomposition the
algorithm can give the best decisions within seconds.
Finally, I consider a cybersecurity game mode where an attacker tries to hide his identity
and reach his goal node. He has some tool-sets and exploits in his possession which can
overlap with other attacker types. The defender tries to pro-actively deploy deception
to reveal more information about the attacker’s identity. I show that the strategic use
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of honeypots can reveal an attacker’s identity earlier. However, in this scenario, both
the defender’s and the attacker’s action space increases exponentially. To mitigate the
scalability issue I reveal localized information of the attacker to the defender to help to
reduce the action space. I also consider a real world network with Virtual Machines where
I show that by analyzing sensor data the defender can get information on the attacker’s
location and reduce his action space to deploy honeypot strategically and dynamically to
identify an attacker type earlier. This contribution is also relevant to the strategic use of
resources rather than just fixed incident response from the defender’s part which makes it
harder for the attacker to pinpoint the defender’s strategy.

vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be viewed as an invisible companion that is increasingly
helping to make our daily life more convenient. In many areas of our life AI is involved
with us; whether by helping us to find the best nearby restaurant or by giving us the best
route to reach our destination; the examples are endless. However, by helping us AI is also
making our lives more complex. We are faced with a problem of making decisions to achieve
a goal in a huge environment where an environment can be either physical or virtual. We
are interacting more with not only people but also intelligent artificial agents. The artificial
intelligent agents are designed in such a way that they have a predefined objective and to
achieve the goal the agent interacts with other agents and humans through a virtual model
of the real world. Due to the size of action space available to choose from and a complex
model of the situation, it is very difficult for a human to make the best decision. Game
theory, a part of AI, analyzes the interactions between intelligent agents to make the best
decisions for them.
Game theory models interaction among self-interested rational agents which is particularly useful in situations when there are limited resources available and the decision-making
agent wants to optimize the allocation of the available resources to maximize his utility.
For example, in the physical security domain, game theory is used to protect important
structures, human lives, wildlife from the attacks of the adversaries. Recently there is a
rise in the use of game theory in the cybersecurity domain too. In this dissertation, I particularly focus on game theoretic models where there is an underlying network structure
involved where the agents interact. Typically a network has inter-connected nodes representing valuable entities that the defender wants to protect and the adversary wants to
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compromise to maximize his gain. The interactions between agents in a network are modeled using different kinds of representations e.g. Normal Form Game (NFG), Extensive
Form Games (EFG), Bayesian Game (BG), and Stackelberg Security Games (SSG). Many
different solution concepts have been proposed for analyzing NFG and EFG including Nash
equilibrium (NE). However, finding Nash equilibria[98] is known to be a computationally
hard problem [55]. On top of that, the inherent structure of a network increases the size
of interacting agents’ strategy spaces exponentially which makes the game theoretic models unscalable, and finding a Nash Equilibrium computationally becomes a much harder
problem. A common approach to tackle this scalability issue is reducing the strategy space
by doing abstraction. Abstraction in game theory is a concept where the original game is
shrunk using different techniques and the reduced game is then analyzed to compute the
NE. After that, the solution is reversed back to the original game.
In this thesis, I work on different abstraction techniques to apply to different gametheoretic models with underlying network structure. Particularly, I will try to answer
what attributes, characteristics, and structure of a network can be exploited to achieve a
high-quality abstracted game model with high scalability in security games.
The first game theoretic model I present is Green Security Games (GSG). It’s based on
SSG and has an underlying network structure. GSG particularly focuses on the problem of
protecting wildlife and natural resources against illegal exploitation, such as poaching and
illegal logging. A grid-based graph is used to capture the physical terrain where each node
represents a small area of the terrain and node utility is defined by animal activity in that
small area. The defender who is in this case patrollers try to prevent poaching by patrolling
the areas by following a particular route. The graph representation entails a huge number
of possible patrolling paths and this leads to a major computational challenge because the
possible number of patrolling paths grows exponentially with the size of the graph. One
key observation is: in a graph representing an actual terrain the animal activity is sparse.
Now my first research question is:
Q1. How can we exploit the sparsity of animal activity in the graph in GSG
2

to achieve an abstracted game model?
In GSG the poachers tend to poach more where there is high animal activity. Removing
nodes with lower animal activity will produce a smaller game model. We use graph contraction to remove nodes with lower priority. However, we do not know the threshold values
for the nodes to remove. In this work, we present a Double Oracle approach: strategy generation combined with graph contraction to automate the removal of lower priority nodes
from the graph. Our experiments show approximately 99.6% improvements on scalability
over the baseline algorithm with approximately 6% deviation from the optimal solution.
Next, I use a game-theoretic model based on a cyber defense scenario using an NFG
for stopping the spread of an attacker (e.g., a botnet) in a network that has a subnet architecture. Most real-world networks are divided into subnets to increase performance and
security, but there are limited resources to inspect/harden devices against cyber attacks.
Automated Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS/HIDS) is an essential defense, but it may
not be possible to use a costly NIDS/HIDS on every network host. In this game model,
the network administrator acts as the defender and a worm acts as the attacker. While
NFG is a very general representation, it is often problematic to solve an NFG for real-world
scenarios because enumerating all possible strategies results in an extremely large game.
For example, in an enterprise network, the large number of hosts and interconnections can
lead to intractable NFG models. My next research question is:
Q2. Can we use network decomposition utilizing the subnet structure to obtain
a high-quality scalable NFG?
In a network, botnets often spread easily within a subnet using worms that exploit open
ports and unpatched vulnerabilities. However, spreading between subnets requires moving
through more secure and highly monitored routers that limit connectivity. This locality
leads to a game model with a particular structure in a Normal Form Game (NFG). This
particular structured NFG can be solved by decomposing the game into smaller subgames. I
present an abstraction algorithm called Subgame Abstraction and Solution Concept (SASC)
3

which utilizes the partially independent subgame structures in an NFG to achieve a highly
scalable game model. The experiments show that using network decomposition the SASC
can solve huge NFG within seconds.
My next project focuses on validation by considering more realistic applications of a
game theoretic model. I was asking myself, what is the point of scalability? Why do we
want to make a game model scalable and what is the motivation behind it? What I found
that one of the primary reasons behind wanting to make a game model scalable is the
ability to use a game model in the real world. In the real world, computation time and
response time matters. Otherwise, we wouldn’t need the concept of scalability as long as
the system or algorithm is feasible. So, my next project is about how we can transform a
game theoretic model into an operational one rather than just show that it can compute a
solution in case of a large input size. The idea of the project is a multi-agent adversarial
interaction between an APT and a defender where the objective of the APT is to reach his
goal machine by hiding his identity. The defender wants to reveal the identity of the APT
and stop it by pro-actively using deception in a strategic fashion. I transform the game
theoretic model into an empirical game theoretic model and then I take my first stab at
handling the scalability issue of the empirical game theoretic model.
The project focuses on formally modeling what types of actions the defender can take
to support more detailed APT identification early in the attack chain, allowing more information to target specific defensive responses. However, different APT may use the same
core malware toolkits and common tactics. The APTs may intentionally try to look similar
to other actors, and may even change during the course of an attack, leading to a complete
change in focus. I constructed the game model in such a way that it’s simple enough to
start with and flexible enough to gradually add real-world complexities for future projects.
The proposed game model is a multi-stage dynamic game that considers a post-exploitation
scenario between an APT and the network defender. The game model is focused on detecting an APT early by deploying pro-active deception (honeypot/honey). However, when
the defender wants to deploy deception he needs to evaluate all the honeypot deployment
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settings in all the places possible in the network. As a result, the action space increases
exponentially with the size of the network. Now the question is:
Q3.1. Can we exploit the locality of information and network security measures?
In this game model, if the defender has no information on the attacker’s current position
then he has to consider every possible action space to evaluate the deployments of different
honeypots in different positions of a network. To mitigate the issue we reveal some information about the attacker’s last position on the network to the defender. Our experiments
show that information reveal can help to predict the next location of the attacker; and the
defender can further reduce the action space to make the game model more scalable.
Next, I incorporated real-world constraints and rules in the game model to transform
it into an empirical game theoretic model. For example, in a computer network, it is most
probable that when an attacker just had a foothold of the network, he does not know about
the topology of the whole network. Also, since defender can use moving target defense and
dynamic honeypot so it is unrealistic to give accurate topology information to the attacker.
So, unlike the game theoretic model, in this empirical model, the attacker cannot compute
an attack path in the network. I had to consider how an attacker can make a plan to choose
an optimal strategy that goes with his preference, so the model transformation was a big
part of this project. However, in this project, the defender’s action space increases with
the uncertainty of the attacker’s location. So, the question is:
Q3.2. How can a NIDS reduce the action space of the defender to make the
algorithm work in a real-world network?
In the previous game-theoretic model we assumed that the defender knows the last
position of the attacker. However, that is unrealistic in the sense that there is no perfect
detection system to detect an attacker’s position accurately. However, for this project
sensing is the only way we can reduce the defender’s action space effectively. The defender
5

needs to sense the environment using sensors which can be analyzed (using NIDS) to predict
an attacker’s position which can mitigate the problem of huge action space considered by the
defender. From the sensor’s data collection and utilizing the CDES detection module, we
were able to reduce the action space of the defender. Finally, the experiments show that the
defender can strategically deploy honeypot in the network to identify an attacker’s identity.
For the next couple of chapters, I discuss related works and background. After that, I
explore the research questions in different domains starting with the GSG.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1

Green Security Game

Green Security Game (GSG) [46, 69, 123] focuses on protecting wildlife and natural resources from environmental crimes such as poaching and illegal logging [57]. Limited resource is a common issue in the GSG domain because of the vast area that needs to be
protected by patrolling. There are initial works on GSG game models [104, 119] which
enumerates all possible combinations of the action spaces. Some improvements were made
in the next iteration of the game models [75, 100]. Still, they are not efficient enough to
handle a large scale GSG model. There are works in the SSG model that tries to handle
large scale game model by using a more compact representation [79, 75]. Some works
focus on solving the game models more efficiently by utilizing efficient optimization algorithms e.g. branch and bound, cutting plane [124, 75]. The most recent application called
PAWS [56] approaches the scalability issue by incorporating cutting plane and column
generation techniques.

2.2

Game Theory for Cyber Domain

Game theory in cybersecurity is a particularly evolving and challenging domain. Most of the
current approaches in the cyber domain use adhoc defense mechanisms or ML techniques.
These models ignore a crucial part of the cyber domain that is the multi-agent adversarial
interactions. However, due to the complexities, scalability issues, and learning curve of
the game theoretic models it did not get popularity in the cyber industry even though it
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is very promising. The research area is however continuing to flourish with contributions
to the theoretical aspect of game theoretic models in the cyber domain. A survey by Roy
et al. [109] listed comprehensive works of game theory in the cyber domain. Jormokka et
al. [77] used the static game with imperfect information to represent cyber warfare game.
Carin et al. [49] introduced a static game model for the strategic protection of intellectual
properties in the cyber domain. Liu et al. [92] presented a game theoretic model to represent
the interaction between a DDoS attacker and a network admin. Liu et al. [93] proposed
a Bayesian game model to solve network intrusion detection problem by updating the
belief on an attacker’s actions. Chen [51] introduced a game model that minimizes the
worm propagation speed in a network using a dynamic game. Alpacan et al. [37] used
a Markov game model to represent adversarial interactions between IDS and an attacker
where the attacker can have imperfect information about the sensor of the IDS. Bloem et
al. [42] modeled the intrusion response as a resource allocation problem. Alpacan et al. [36]
modeled the interaction between an attacker and a network admin using repeated games
where the sensor is imperfect to detect an attacker.

2.3

Game Theory for Cyber Deception

Game theory holds its special place in cyber deception where the strategic decision is of
utmost importance to maximize strategic randomness and to improve robustness, resource
allocation, and resiliency. Radek et al. [105] proposed a game model for effective honeypot
allocation in the network. Kiekintveld [80] discussed several game models for the strategic
use of honeypots in the network. Horak et al. [72] introduced a game model to pro-actively
manipulate adversary’s behavior to thwart an attacker from learning the target network.
Jajoda et al. [76] describe several works in cyber deception where game theory can be
utilized vastly. Among recent works Zhu et al. [126] introduced a tutorial and taxonomy
on the use of cyber deception using incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism
design theory.
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2.4

Abstraction

To analyze games that are beyond the limits of standard solution algorithms, an increasingly
common approach is to apply some form of automated abstraction to simplify the game.
The simplified game is then analyzed using an available solver, and the solution is somehow
mapped back into the original game. If the simplified game can retain the key strategic
features of the original game, then in principle the solution of the simpler game may be
a reasonable approximation of the solution to the original game. This general approach
has been very successful in developing computer poker agents, and most of the successful
players in the annual competition in computer poker over the past years have used some
variation of this idea (e.g., [48, 44, 62, 63, 65, 66, 127]).
Many of the recent works on abstraction focus on extensive form games with sequential
interactions and uncertainty, in part due to the motivation of poker agents. These include a wide variety of specific methods including both lossless abstractions [64] and lossy
abstractions [110]. While many lossy methods do not provide bounds on the error introduced by the abstraction, some recent work has been able to provide theoretical bounds for
very general classes of games [86, 85]. Another recent example considers imperfect recall
abstractions with earth mover’s distance [59] for a hierarchical abstraction [47] technique.
State of the art techniques particularly focus on computing a NE in an iterative fashion.
Two types of algorithms have been used heavily: regret minimization algorithm based on
counterfactual regret minimization [127, 89, 44] (CFR) and first-order methods (FOMs) e.g.
excessive gap techniques (EGT) [99] with proper distance generating functions (DGF) for
EFG strategies [70, 87, 83, 88].
The approach behind CFR is to decompose overall regret into a set of additive regrets
and minimizing them independently. Minimizing the immediate regrets minimizes the
overall regrets and after playing a two-player zero-sum game repeatedly NE is reached
eventually. To handle huge games with imperfect-information abstraction technique is
used by bucketing similar states together. Then the simplified game is approximately
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solved using tabular CFR. A variant of CFR called CF R+ [117] was used to near optimally
solve heads-up limit Texas Hold’em [44].
Another variant of CFR called MCCFR [89] was used to make computer poker agents
called Libratus by solving subgames [48] which beat expert human poker players in no-limit
Texas Hold’em which has 10161 decision points before abstractions. This poker agent has
three main modules. In the first module, an abstracted game was generated by using action
abstraction and card abstraction. In the action abstraction, less number of bets are used by
using granular bettings. For the card abstraction, similar hands are put together and they
are treated identically. Then MCCFR is used to generate an approximate strategy for the
whole game. The solution provided a detailed strategy for the earlier parts of the game but
a less fine grained strategy for the latter rounds of the game. When the game reaches the
later portion of the game, the second module of Libratus builds a fine grained abstracted
model of the subgame and solves the subgame in real-time. The third module fills in the
missing pieces of the abstracted game by using the actions of the opponent and creates a
strategy for those parts. There is also another computer poker agent called DeepStack [97]
that uses action abstraction and CFR to solve Heads Up No limit Poker.
In another work [84] a FOM called EGT with dilated entropy distance function can
compete with CFR techniques to solve large scale sequential games. For experiments the
authors used EGT to solve the subgames in the Libratus agent to solve no-limit Texas
Holdem Poker. The results show that EGT can outperform CFR in many cases. There
are works in the literature on abstraction techniques on game models related to GSG (e.g.
EFG, SSG) [86, 78, 82] that focus on providing a unified framework to abstract the EFG
action space to approximate Stackelberg Equilibriums.

10

Chapter 3
Background
3.1

Normal Form Games

Game theory analyzes interactions between multiple intelligent players by modeling the
scenarios as a game. A game can be either one shot, sequential or repetitive. Normal
Form Game (NFG) is the most popular form of game to represent player interactions and
strategy space. There is also Stackelberg Security Game, Green Security Game (GSG) and
Extensive Form Game (EFG).
A normal form game captures all possible combinations of strategies for the players in a
matrix form. A player can choose either a single “pure” strategy or play a “mixed” strategy
that specifies a probability distribution over the pure strategies. The goal for all players
is to maximize their expected utility. Formally, a finite, N -person normal-form game is
described by a tuple (N, A, u), where [114]:
• N is a finite set of N players, indexed by i.
• A = A1 × ... × An , where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i. Each
vector a = (a1 , ..., an ) ∈ A is called an action profile. So, ai ∈ Ai is pure action in the
original game. ai,k is th kth action for player i.
• si ∈ Si is the space of mixed strategies in the game.
• u = (u1 , ..., un ) where ui : A 7→ R is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function for
player i, which is extended to mixed strategies as usual by using expected utility.
• π i (ai ) gives the probability of action ai for player i.
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• Ai (O) gives the set of available actions for player i in NFG O.
Throughout this paper, we will consider abstractions that are also represented as (simpler) normal-form games. We will use the following modified notation to refer to an abstracted game (N̂ , Â, û):
• Â = Â1 × ... × Ân , where Âi is a finite set of actions available to player i, with action
profiles â = (â1 , ..., ân ) ∈ Â. We will use âi,k for the kth action for player i.
• û = (û1 , ..., ûn ) where ûi : Â 7→ R̂ is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function for
player i.
• âi ∈ Âi is a pure action in the abstracted game.
• ŝi ∈ Ŝi is a mixed strategy in the abstracted game.
• Âi (R) is the set of available actions for player i.
• π i (âi ) gives the probability of action âi for player i.
Table 3.1 is an example of a two-player normal form game.
C

D

A

4,4 6,2

B

1,7 5,2

Table 3.1: Example Normal Form Game
The row player can choose action A or action B. The column player can choose either
action C or action D. If row player chooses action A and column player chooses action
D, payoffs are 6 and 2 for row and column player respectively. Main purpose of modeling
an interaction between players is to analyze the game model and find the strategy for the
players where every player acts rationally and maximizes his own outcome. A strategy for
a player can either be a pure strategy or a mixed strategy.
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Definition 3.1 (Mixed Strategy[91]). Let (N, A, u) be a normal-form game and for any
set X let Π(X) be the set of all probability distributions over X. Then the set of mixed
strategies for player i is Si = Π(Ai ).
In a pure strategy, only one action has positive support. And we want to find how the
players choose their strategy to maximize their output. In a sense, every player wants to
play his best against his opponent’s strategy.
Definition 3.2 (Best Response[91]). Player i ’s best response to other players (-i )’s strategy
profile s−i is a mixed strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that ui (s∗i , s−i ) ≥ ui (si , s−i ) for all strategies
si ∈ S i .
When all players are performing the best response to all other players this is known as
a Nash Equilibrium (NE). This is described more formally in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3 (Nash Equilibrium[91]). A strategy profile s = (s1 , . . . , sn ) is a Nash equilibrium if, for all agents i, si is a best response to s−i .
The outcome of the example game is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium because all
players are playing the best response to all other players.

3.1.1

Solution Concepts

Once the abstracted game is constructed, we must choose a solution concept to analyze this
simplified game. A natural choice that is often used is to search for a (possibly approximate)
Nash equilibrium of the abstracted game. We consider both pure and mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium, as well as a different concept that directly minimizes a bound on the
approximation quality in the original game.
Approximate Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) all players play pure strategies that are mutual
best-responses, so no player can gain by changing to a different pure strategy. It is simple
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to check whether a given outcome is a PSNE by simply checking the possible gains from
deviation. However, PSNE are not guaranteed to exist. Therefore, we instead look for the
pure-strategy outcome the is the best approximate equilibrium, with the minimum possible
gain for any player to change to a different strategy. This is known as an ε-Nash equilibrium
(in a Nash equilibrium ε = 0). We first calculate the values of deviations for each action am
using equation 3.1, and then select the action profile that minimizes the maximum benefit
to deviation, as in equation 3.2

ε(a∗i ∈ Ai ) = max∀ai ∈Ai ,∀aj ∈Aj [ui (ai , aj ) − ui (a∗i , aj )] ∀j ∈ N, i 6= j

(ai ∈ Ai ) = min∀ai ∈Ai [ε(ai )]

∀i ∈ N

(3.1)

(3.2)

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We also calculate a version of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium using the software package
Gambit [95]. There are several different solvers for finding Nash equilibria in this toolkit.
We used one based on Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) [67] that is based on a tracing
procedure with noisy best-response functions for the players. In this limit as the noise in
the best responses goes to zero this method converges to a Nash equilibrium. In practice,
we have found this to be a relatively reliable way to find a sample Nash equilibrium.

3.2

Stackelberg Security Game

Stackelberg Security Game can modeled as a NFG with two players, a defender, Θ, and an
attacker, Ψ, where each player can be either an individual or a group. Each player has a set
of possible pure strategies σΘ ∈ ΣΘ and σΨ ∈ ΣΨ . Each player also has a mixed strategy,
δΘ ∈ ∆Θ and δΨ ∈ ∆Ψ , played over the pure strategies using a probability distribution.
Payoffs for defender are defined for joint pure strategy outcomes as ΩΘ : ΣΘ × ΣΨ ⇒ R
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and for attacker ΩΨ : ΣΘ × ΣΨ ⇒ R. Given a mixed strategy we can easily compute the
payoff by taking the expected value over the pure strategy payoffs.
In an SSG there is always a leader and a follower. Leader commits over a strategy.
Follower observes leader strategy and responds with his best strategy. The SSG model
allows us to model a scenario where defender acts as a leader. Adversary acts as follower
where they can put surveillance to monitor defender strategy and act depending on the
observations. In a SSG attacker selects a best response after observing defender’s action
which can be formulated as Fψ : ∆Θ ⇒ ∆Ψ .

3.2.1

Stackelberg Equilibrium

Standard solution concept in a game model is Nash Equilibrium where no one can gain by
unilaterally deviating to another strategy, that means every player plays the best response
to each other. Stackelberg Equilibrum in an SSG is a refinement of the Nash Equilibrium
profile where each player plays according to subgame perfect equilibrium in a subgame of
the original game. The subgame perfect equilibrium eliminates any form of threats which
has no form of credibility. There are two kinds of Stackelberg Equilibrium: strong and
weak. In a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) attacker plays for defender’s optimal
payoff in case there is a tie between strategies. In a Weak Stackelberg Equilibrium follower
plays the worst strategy for the defender.
Definition 3.4 (Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium[90, 45]). A pair of strategies (δθ , Fψ ) form
an SSE if they satisfy the following conditions:
0

0

0

1. The leader plays best response : ΩΘ (δΘ , F (δΘ )) ≥ ΩΘ (δΘ , F (δΘ )) ∀δΘ ∈ ∆Θ
0

0

0

2. The follower plays best response : ΩΨ (δΘ , F (δΘ )) ≥ ΩΨ (δΘ , δΨ ) ∀δΘ ∈ ∆Θ , ∀δΨ ∈
∆Ψ
0

0

3. The follower optimally breaks ties for the leader : ΩΨ (δΘ , F (δΘ )) ≥ ΩΨ (δΘ , δΨ ) ∀δΘ ∈
0

∆Θ , ∀δΨ ∈ ∆∗Ψ , where ∆∗Ψ is the set of best responses of the follower.
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Covered

Uncovered

Defender

5

-20

Attacker

10

30

Table 3.2: Compact representation for an attacked target
In a SSG playing a deterministic strategy by the leader is a guaranteed loss because the
follower will be able to exploit that. But a planned randomized strategy to maximize the
payoff is always an advantage.

3.2.2

Compact Security Game Model

In an SSE the defender tries to protect valuable targets, airports, banks, ports, by allocating
resources. In a normal form representation sometimes the number of targets are high and
the problem space suffers from combinatorial explosion. To avoid that there is a compact
representation of the SSG. Table 3.2 shows the compact representation of a game for an
attacked target. The important feature of this model is that the payoff depends only on
the attacked target and whether the target is covered or not. From payoffs perspective
all resource allocations are identical. We have a coverage vector C, which gives us the
probability of defending a target. We also have an attack vector A which gives us the
probability of a target being attacked by the attacker.
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Chapter 4
Abstraction in Green Security Games
4.1

Introduction

We face many complex security threats with the need to protect people, infrastructure,
computer systems, and natural resources from criminal and terrorist activity. A common
challenge in these security domains is making the best use of limited resources to improve
security against intelligent, motivated attackers. The area of green security focuses on
problems related to protecting wildlife and natural resources against illegal exploitation,
such as poaching and illegal logging. Resource limitations are particularly acute in fighting
many types of environmental crime, due to a combination of limited budgets and massive
areas that need surveillance and protection. For example, it is common for small numbers
of rangers, local police, and volunteers to patrol protected national parks that may cover
thousands of square miles of rugged terrain [71].
Work on green security games [46, 57] has proposed formulating the problem of finding
optimal patrols to prevent environmental crime as a Stackelberg security game [79]. In
these games, the defender (e.g., park ranger service) must decide on a randomized strategy
for patrolling the protected area, limited by the geographic constraints and the number of
available resources. The attacker (e.g., poacher) selects an area of the park to attack based
on the intended target and knowledge of the typical patrolling strategy (e.g., from previous
observations and experience). Green security games are used to find randomized patrolling
strategies that maximize environmental protection given the resources available.
Green security games typically model the movement constraints for the defender patrols using a graph representing the physical terrain. Unfortunately, this leads to a major
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computational challenge because the number of possible paths for the defender grows exponentially with the size of the graph. Enumerating all possible combinations of paths for
multiple resources makes the problem even more intractable [104, 119]. Several algorithms
have been proposed in the literature to solve these games more efficiently [75, 100]. Most
of these rely on incremental strategy generation (known as double oracle algorithms, or
column/constraint generation) to solve an integer programming formulation of the problem
without enumerating the full strategy space. The most recent application called PAWS [56]
approaches the scalability issue by incorporating cutting plane and column generation techniques.
Here, we take a new approach that combines strategy generation methods with automated game abstraction methods based on graph contraction. The idea of using automated
abstraction has been very successful in solving other types of very large games, such as
computer poker [62, 63, 65, 66, 127]. The basic idea of our game abstraction is motivated
by graph contraction techniques used to speed up pathfinding and other computations on
graphs. When we apply graph contraction to a green security game, it dramatically reduces
the strategy space for the defender, leading to lower solving time. To improve scalability
even further we integrate graph contraction with strategy generation to create a new class
of algorithms capable of solving very large green security games. We evaluate our new
algorithms on graph-based security games motivated by the problems encountered in green
security domains, including some based on real world data sets. The experiments show
that we can dramatically improve solution times by using abstraction in combination with
strategy generation, leading to high-quality approximations within seconds even for graphs
with a thousand nodes.

4.2

Related Work

The first approach to compute security resource allocations was to find a randomized strategy after enumerating all possible resource allocations [104], which is used by the Los
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Angeles Airport Police in an application called ARMOR [106]. A more compact form
of security game representation was used [79] to develop a faster algorithm (IRIS [119]),
which is used for scheduling by the Federal Marshal Service (FAMS). ASPEN [75] was
introduced to deal with the exponential size of games with complex scheduling constraints
by using a branch-and-price approach. Most recently, to tackle more massive games an
approach based on cutting planes was introduced [124] to make the solution space more
manageable. Game theoretic algorithms are also used to secure ports [112] and trains [125].
Recently, successful deployment of game theoretic applications motivated researchers to use
game theory in green security domains [46, 69, 123]. This led to a new game model called
GSG [57]. Assumptions about the attacker being able to fully observe the defender strategy can be unrealistic in some cases, so partial observability and bounded rationality have
been introduced to make the attacker model better fit the practice. Defender payoff uncertainty has also been addressed with these issues in an algorithm called ARROW [100].
Despite the models and algorithms introduced, how to handle the large strategy space in
GSGs remains a challenge. In this paper, we introduce abstraction techniques to address
this problem. Many abstraction techniques have been developed for extensive form games
with uncertainty including both lossy [110] and lossless [64] abstraction. There has been
some work which gives bounds on the error introduced by abstraction [85]. There are also
imperfect recall abstractions that consider hierarchical abstraction [47] and Earth mover’s
distance [59].
Graph contraction techniques [60] have been used to achieve fast routing in road networks, where contraction acts as a pre-processing step. This method has been improved
using fast bidirectional Dijkstra searches [115, 61]. A time-dependent contraction algorithm
has also been introduced for time-dependent road networks [41]. Graph contraction has
also been used in imperfect information security games with infinite horizon where the area
is patrolled by a single robot [40]. In this paper, we leverage insights from graph contraction to handle the large strategy space in GSGs. Another recent closely related work [74]
uses cut-based graph contraction and also column generation approach for restricting the
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strategy space, but for a different type of security model based on checkpoint placement
for urban networks.

4.3

Domain Motivation

Illegal activities such as poaching pose a major threat to biodiversity across all types of
habitats and many species such as rhinos and tigers. A report [33] from the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) on May 2015 stated that the elephant population in Mozambique
has shrunk from 20, 000 to 10, 300 over the last five years. Elephants were recently added
to the IUCN Red List [34]. Marine species also face danger due to illegal fishing and
overfishing, causing harm to the people of coastal areas who depend on fishing for both
sustenance and livelihood. According to World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the global
estimated financial loss due to illegal fishing is $23.5 billion [35]. Organizations like WCS
are studying strategies for combating environmental crime that include patrols of both land
and sea habitats to detect and deter poaching. PAWS [56] is a new application based on
green security games that help to design patrolling strategies to protect wildlife in threatened areas. The area of interest is divided into grid cells that capture information about
the terrain, animal density, etc. Each grid cell is a potential target for the poachers. The
patroller plans a route to protect the targets along a path. However, if the grid cell is too
large (e.g., 1km by 1km) or the terrain is complex, it is very difficult for the patroller to
patrol even a single grid cell without any detailed path provided in the cell. Therefore, a
fine-grained discretization is often required, leading to a large number of targets and an exponential number of patrol routes that existing solvers cannot handle. PAWS handles this
problem by pre-defining a limited set of routes based on domain knowledge of features like
ridgelines and streams, which can be found based on elevation changes. We also observe
that in many green security domains, there is a high variance in the importance of the targets. For example, Figure 4.1a shows the mean number of elephants in each area of a grid
representing the Queen Elizabeth National Park in Uganda [58]. There are many cells that
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(b) A graph representation of a grid-based GSG
(a patrolling path is shown in red).
(a) Mean numbers of elephants/0.16km2 in
Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda

Figure 4.1: Domain example and game model.
have no animal count at all, and if there is minimal activity it is very inefficient to consider
these areas as targets to patrol (or poach). This motivates our abstraction-based approach
to make it computationally feasible to directly analyze high-fidelity maps for green security
without preprocessing.

4.4

Game Model and Basic Solution Technique

A typical green security game (GSG) model is specified by dividing a protected wildlife
area into grid based cells, as shown in Figure 4.1a. Each cell is considered a potential
target ti where an attacker could attempt a poaching action. We transform this grid-based
representation into a graph as shown in Figure 4.1b. Each node represents a target ti .
Definition 4.1 (GSG Graph). A GSG Graph is a graph G = (V, E) where each node
ti ∈ V is associated with a patrolling distance sti and each edge eij ∈ E is associated with
a traveling distance d(i, j). There exists a base node B ∈ V . A feasible patrolling path is a
sequence of consecutive nodes that starts and ends with B, with a total distance that does
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not exceed the distance limit dmax .
For example, in Figure 4.1b, st1 = 100m. This means that to protect target t1 , the
patroller needs to patrol for a distance 100m within target t1 . d(2, 3) = 1km indicates
the distance from target t2 to t3 . The defender patrols to protect every target on the
patrolling path. Therefore, the total distance of a path is the sum of patrolling and travel
distance. Typically the patrol starts in a base station and ends in the same base station.
For example, a patrolling path is shown in Figure 4.1b where the patrol starts at t0 and
traverses through targets t1 → t6 → t9 → t4 and ends back in target t0 .
The defender has a limited number of resources R, each of which can be assigned to at
most one patrolling path that covers a set of targets t ∈ T . So the defender’s pure strategies
are the set of joint patrolling paths Jm ∈ J. Each joint patrolling path Jm assigns each
resource to a specific path. We denote a patrolling path by pk and the base target by tb .
The length of pk is constrained by dmax .
We use a matrix P = PJm t = (0, 1)n to represent the mapping between joint patrolling
paths and the targets covered by these paths, where PJm t represents whether target t is
covered by the joint patrolling path Jm . We define the defender’s mixed strategy x as a
probability distribution over the joint patrolling paths J where xm is the probability of
patrolling a joint patrolling path Jm . The coverage probability for each target is ct =
P
J m PJ m t x m .
If target t is protected then the defender receives reward Udc (t) when the attacker attacks
target t, otherwise a penalty Udu (t) is given. The attacker receives reward Uau (t) if the attack
is on an area where the defender is not patrolling, or penalty Uac (t) if the attack is executed
in a patrolled area. These values can be based on the density of the animals in the area
attacked, as a proxy for the expected losses due to poaching activities. We focus on the
zero-sum game case where Udc (t) = Uac (t) = 0 and Udu (t) = −Uau (t). In the rest of the paper,
we also refer to Uau (t) as the utility of target t.
We use the Stackelberg model for GSG. In this model, the patroller, who acts as defender, moves first and the adversary observes the defender’s mixed strategy and chooses a
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strategy afterward. The defender tries to protect targets T = t1 , t2 , ..., tn from the attackers
by allocating R resources. The attacker attacks one of the T targets. We focus on the case
where the attacker is perfectly rational and compute the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
(SSE) [90, 45, 121], where the defender selects a mixed strategy (in this case a probability
distribution x over joint patrolling paths Jm ), assuming that the adversary will be able to
observe the defender’s strategy and will choose the best response, breaking ties in favor of
the defender. Given a defender’s mixed strategy x and the corresponding coverage vector
c, the expected payoff for the attacker is
Ua (c, t) = max{(1 − ct )Uau (t)}
t∈T

(4.1)

It is possible to solve this problem by enumerating all feasible joint patrolling paths [75].
In the case of zero-sum games, the optimal patrolling strategy for the defender can be
determined by solving the following linear program (LP).
min

k

x,k

(4.2)

(1 − P x)Uau ≤ k
X
xi ≤ 1

(4.3)

x ≥0

(4.5)

i

(4.4)

Equation 4.2 represents the objective function, which minimizes the expected payoff for the
attacker, or equivalently, maximizes the expected payoff for the defender. Constraint 4.4
makes sure that the probability distribution over the joint patrolling paths does not exceed
one. The solution of the LP is a probability distribution x over the joint patrolling paths J,
and this is the strategy the defender commits to. The attacker will choose the target with
highest expected utility, as shown in Constraints 4.3. This formulation does not scale well
to large games due to the exponential number of possible joint paths as the graph grows
larger.
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4.5

Solving GSG with Abstraction

We describe our approach in three stages. First, we describe our method for contracting
a graph by removing nodes and calculating a new set of edges to connect these nodes
that retain the shortest path information. This contracted graph can be solved using any
existing algorithm for GSG; as a baseline, we use the LP on the full set of paths. Second,
we describe a single-oracle approach for finding the set of targets that must be included in
the contracted game. This method restricts the set of targets to a small set of the highestvalued targets, and iteratively adds in additional targets as needed. Finally, we describe
the double-oracle algorithm This uses the same structure as the single oracle, but instead
of solving each restricted game optimally, we restrict the defender’s strategy space and use
heuristic oracles to iteratively generate paths to add to the restricted game.

4.5.1

Graph Contraction

Our approach combines the key ideas in double oracle methods and graph contraction.
There are often relatively few important targets in a GSG. For example, the key regions
of high animal density are relatively few, and many areas have low density, as shown in
Figure 4.1a. This suggests that many targets in the game can be removed to simplify the
analysis while retaining the important features of the game.
We first describe how we construct an abstracted (simplified) graph for a restricted set
of target nodes. Essentially, we remove all of the nodes except the restricted set, and then
add additional edges to make sure the shortest paths are preserved.
Many graph contraction procedures used in pathfinding remove nodes one by one, but
we use a contraction procedure that removes the nodes in one step. Suppose we have
decided to remove the set of nodes Tu ∈ T . We find all the neighbors of set Tu , denoted
as V . Next we try to find the shortest paths between each pair of nodes (vi , vj ) ∈ V
that traverse through nodes Tu where vi and vj are not adjacent. We use Floyd-Warshall
algorithm [53] to find the shortest paths for all the nodes in V using only nodes Tu . If the
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(a) Unnecessary nodes 5, 6, 9

(b) Edge 8− > 5− > 2 to be removed

(c) New shortcut path 8− > 2

(d) Final graph after contraction of node 5, 6, 9

Figure 4.2: Instant Contraction procedure for different nodes
length of the shortest path does not exceed dmax , we add an edge (vi , vj ) in the contracted
graph, with distance equals the length of the shortest path.
Figure 4.2 shows how the contraction works. Figure 4.2a shows the removed nodes
Tu = (5, 6, 9). The neighbor set of Tu is V = (0, 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14). For convenience,
we show a breakdown of the step in Figure 4.2b where the edge (8 → 5 → 2) is shown and in
Figure 4.2c where the edge (8 → 5 → 2) is replaced with shortcut 8 → 2. Figure 4.2d shows
the final stage of the graph after contracting nodes 5, 6, 9. Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode
for the contraction procedure.
Reverse Mapping
When we solve a GSG with a contracted graph (e.g., using the standard LP), the paths
found in the solution must be mapped back to the paths in the original graph so they
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Algorithm 1 Instant Contraction Procedure
1: procedure InstantContractGraph
2:

G ← Graph()

3:

nd ← ContractedN odes()

4:

nnei ← ComputeN eighbors(nd )

5:

apsp ← AllP airShortestP ath(G, nd , paths)

6:

for v ← neighbors.pop() do

7:
8:

. Initiate the graph to contract
. Get the nodes to contract

for v 0 ← neighbors.pop() do
0

if v 6= v &notadjacent(v, v 0 ) then
d ← apsp[v][v 0 ]

9:
10:

path ← getP ath(paths, v, v 0 )

11:

if d ≤ dmax then

. if d is less than the distance limit

12:

U pdateN eighbors(v, v 0 , path, d)

13:

v.AddN eighbor(v 0 , path)

14:

v 0 .AddN eighbor(v, path)
end if

15:
16:
17:

end if
end for

18:

end for

19:

RemoveAllContractedN odes(G, nd )

20:

.

end procedure
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can be executed. This is because a single edge in the abstract path can correspond to a
path of several nodes in the original graph. In algorithm 1, when the contracted graph
is constructed, the corresponding path in the original graph of each edge being added is
already recorded, and is the basis the reverse mapping.
Theorem 4.2. The contraction process described in Algorithm 1 preserves the shortest
paths for any pair of nodes that are not removed in the original graph. Formally, given
a graph G = (T, E) and a subset of nodes Tu , Algorithm 1 provides a contracted graph
G0 = (T \ Tu , E 0 ) and the length of the shortest path for any pair of nodes (vi , vj ) ∈ T \ Tu
in G0 is the same as in G.
Proof. Let t1 → t2 → t3 → . . . → ti → . . . → tj → . . . → tk is the shortest path between
t1 and tk and d(G, t1 , tk ) = x, d(G0 , t1 , tk ) = x0 where x < x0 and ti , ..., tj ∈ Tu nodes are
being contracted. So,
d(G0 , t1 , tk ) = x0
= t1 → t2 → t3 → . . . → tk
= t1 → t2 → t3 → . . . → tk
= t1 → t2 → t3 → ... → t0i → . . . → t0j → ... → tk

(Reverse mapping)

= t1 → t2 → t3 → ... → ti → . . . → tj → ... → tk

(Algorithm 1)

=x

So, out initial assumption of x < x0 was wrong.

4.5.2

Single-Oracle Algorithm Using Abstraction

We begin by describing a basic “single oracle” algorithm that restricts only the attacker’s
strategy space (i.e., the number of targets). The basic observation that leads to this
approach is based on the notion of an attack set. In the Stackelberg equilibrium solution
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Algorithm 2 Single Oracle With Abstraction (SO)
Input: original graph G, target utility Ui , ∀i ∈ V
Output: defender mixed strategy x and coverage vector c
1:

T̄ =GreedyCoverR(G)

. Find initial set of targets to be considered in the restricted

graph
2:

Set current graph Gc = G

3:

repeat

4:

Gt =Contract(Gc , T̄ )

5:

(u, xt , ct ) = Solve(Gt )

. Contract graph
. Solve restricted graph, get attacker’s expected utility u,

defender strategy xt , coverage vector ct
6:

v = AttEU (Gc , ct ) . Calculate actual attacker’s expected utility on current graph

7:

if v == u then

8:
9:

Break
end if

10:

Gc =ContractWithThreshold(Gc , u)

11:

if Gc is small enough then

12:

(u, x, c) = Solve(Gc )

13:

Break

. Solve Gc directly

14:

end if

15:

Add at least one additional target into T̄

16:

. Remove targets with utility < u

until 1 < 0

to a security game, there is a set of targets that the attacker is willing to attack; this is the
set that the defender must cover with positive probability. All other target have maximum
payoffs lower than the expected payoff for the attacker in the equilibrium solution, so the
attacker will never prefer to attack one of these targets, even though it is left unprotected.
If we could determine ahead of time which set of targets must be covered in the solution,
we could simply apply graph contraction to this set of targets, solve the resulting game,
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and be guaranteed to find the optimal solution.
Our approach is to start by considering only a small set of targets T̄ , perform contraction, and solve the abstracted game for this small set of targets. If the attacker expected
value in the solution is lower than the value the attacker can get from attacking the best
target that was not included in the restricted game, we add at least one (and possible
more than one) additional target to the restricted game and repeat the process. Targets
are added in decreasing order of the attacker’s payoff for attacking the target if it is not
protected at all. If we solve a restricted game and the attacker’s expected value is greater
than the unprotected values of all remaining targets, we can terminate having found the
correct attack set and the optimal solution.
The initial set of targets to be considered is determined by GreedyCoverR (GCR). First
consider the case where there is only one patroller. We use an algorithm named GC1 to find
a greedy patrolling path. GC1 greedily inserts targets to the path and asks the patroller
to take the shortest path to move from one target to the next target. The targets are
added sequentially in a descending order of the target utility. GC1 terminates when the
distance limit constraint is violated. GCR calls GC1 R times to find greedy paths for R
patrolling resources. If the greedy paths can cover the top K targets, GCR returns the set
of targets whose utility is no less than the utility of the (K + 1)th target. This is because a
restricted graph with the top K targets can be perfectly protected given the greedy paths,
and therefore the patroller can try to protect more targets.
Algorithm 2 shows psuedocode for this procedure. Clearly, u is non-decreasing and v
is non-increasing with each iteration. For a value of u in any iteration, we can claim that
any target whose utility is smaller than u can be safely removed as those targets will never
be attacked (attacker will not deviate if those targets are added to the small graph). The
function Contract(G, T̄ ) completes two tasks. First, it removes targets that are not in T̄ ,
and second, refine the graph by removing dominated targets. In each iteration, u provides
a lower bound of the attacker’s expected utility in the optimal solution (optimal defender
strategy) and v provides an upper bound. If v == u, it means current solution is the
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optimal. Line 15 adds at least one target to the set T̄ . Figure 4.3 illustrates the algorithm
on an example graph. Figure 4.3 illustrates Algorithm 2 with an example.

4.5.3

Double Oracle Graph Contraction

The single oracle methods can prevent us from having to solve the full graph with the
complete set of targets. However, it still assumes that we use an exact, exhaustive method
to solve the smaller abstracted graphs. For very large problems, this may still be too slow
and use too much memory. To address this we introduce the Double Oracle method that
also restricts the defender’s strategy space when solving the abstracted graphs. This basic
idea (a version of column generation) has been widely used in security games literature
[75, 113]. Algorithm 3 outlines the procedure.
The outer loop is based on the single oracle method, and gradually adds targets to the
restricted set. However, each time we solve the problem for a new contracted graph, we also
start from a restricted set of possible paths for the defender. We then solve the “Master”
problem (i.e., the original LP), but only with this restricted set of paths. If the solution
to this restricted problem already implies that we need to add more targets (because the
attacker’s payoff is lower than the next best target), we do so and start over with a new,
larger contracted graph. Otherwise, we solve a “Slave” problem to find at least one new
path to add to the restricted problem, and then go back to solve the Master again. This
process terminates when we cannot add any additional paths to the Master that would
improve the payoff for the defender (and lower it for the attacker).
To guarantee that we have found the optimal solution, the slave should always return a
new path to add that has the minimum reduced cost. The reduced cost of a new joint path
P
Jm is rJm = − i yi Uau (i)PJm ,i − ρ, where yi refers to the dual variable of the ith constraint
in the original LP (4.3), and ρ is the dual variable of constraint 4.4. The joint path with the
most negative reduced cost improves the objective the most. If the reduced cost of the best
new joint path is non-negative, then the current solution is optimal. In fact, finding the
joint path with the lowest reduced cost is equivalent to solving the following combinatorial
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(a) Step 1

(b) Step 2

(c) Step 3

(d) Step 4

Figure 4.3: Example of Single-oracle Algorithm. The numbers shown in the nodes represent
the index and the utility of the target. Node 10 is the base node and the defender has only
one patrol resource. 4.3a: Original graph (distance limit= 4), which is also the initial
current graph Gc . Red lines indicate the greedy route, which determines T̄ = {10, 9, 8}.
4.3b: First restricted graph Gt and the corresponding optimal defender strategy (taking
the route 10 → 8 → 10 with probability 0.47), which leads to u = 4.23 and v = 7. 4.3c:
Updated current graph Gc , which is achieved by removing all nodes with utility ≤ u (i.e.,
nodes 2,3,4) and then removing dominated targets (node 7 is dominated by node 9 and node
6 is dominated by node 8). 4.3d: Second restricted graph Gt with updated T̄ = {10, 9, 8, 5},
which leads to u=v=4.58 and the termination of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 Double Oracle With Abstraction (DO)
Input: original graph G, target utility Ui , ∀i ∈ V
Output: defender mixed strategy x and coverage vector c
1:

Sort the targets according to attacker’s reward Tsrt =sortTargets()

2:

Get the list of initial targets using GCR from Tsrt , Tcur = GreedyCoverR()

3:

repeat

4:

Set temporary graph where Gt and all targets ti ∈ Gt is also in Tcur

5:

Generate initial set of paths using GreedyPathR, scur = GP R(Gt )

6:

repeat

7:

Solve SSG for Gt , get mixed strategy xt , coverage vector ct , and attacker’s
expected utility u = AttEU (Gt , ct )

8:

Calculate actual attacker’s expected utility on original graph v = AttEU (G, ct )

9:

if u < v then

10:

Break

11:

end if

12:

Generate paths using st = GreedyP athR()

13:

Append paths scur = scur U st

14:

if st == 0 then

15:
16:

Break
end if

17:

until 1 < 0

18:

Find attack target in G attackT arget(G, ct )

19:

Add next n e.g. n = 5 targets to Tcur from Tsrt − Tcur

20:

until u >= v and no more path can be added to scur

optimization problem:
Definition 4.3 (Coin collection problem). In the coin collection problem, a GSG graph
G = (V, E) is given, and each node ti is associated with a number of coins, denoted as Yi .
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When a node is covered by a patrolling path, the coins on the node will be collected and
can be collected at most once. The goal is to find a feasible joint path that collects the
most number of coins.
When Yi = yi Uau (i), the optimal solution of the coin collection problem is the joint
path with the lowest reduced cost. The coin collection problem is NP-hard based on
a reduction form the hamiltonian cycle problem (details omitted for space). Designing
efficient algorithms for finding the optimal or a near-optimal solution of the coin collection
problem can potentially improve the scalability of using the double oracle method to find the
exact optimal solution to GSG. However, here we are interested in maximizing scalability
for the DO approach combined with abstraction, so we designed heuristic methods for the
slave that are very fast, but will not necessarily guarantee the optimal solution. More
specifically, we use Algorithm 4 as a heuristic approach for solving the coin collection
problem.

4.6

Experimental Evaluations

We present a series of experiments to evaluate the computational benefits and solution
quality of our solution methods. These experiments will also answer our Research Question 1 by showing that automated removal of lower priority nodes combined with strategy
generation, which exploits the sparseness of animal density in the terrain, transforms the
game model to a high scalable one. We begin by evaluating the impact of abstraction in
isolation, and then provide a comparison of many different variations of our methods on
synthetic game instances. Finally, we test our best algorithms on large game instances
using real-world data, demonstrating the ability to scale up to real world problems.

4.6.1

Evaluating Graph Abstraction

We begin by isolating the effects of abstraction from the use of strategy generation (using
either the single or double-oracle framework). The baseline method solves a graph-based
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Algorithm 4 GreedyPathR (GPR)
1:

procedure GreedyCover-CoinCollection

2:

Initialize best joint path set Jbest

3:

for iter = 0 to 99 do

4:

if iter == 0 then

5:
6:
7:

T list ← sort(T \ B, Y )
else
T list ← shuf f le(T \ B)

8:

end if

9:

Yr ← Y

10:

. Get a sorted list with decreasing Yi

. Get a random ordered list

. Initialize the coins remained

for j = 1 to R do

11:

Initialize the current patrol route Qj

12:

for each target ti in T list with Yr (i) > 0 do . Check all uncovered targets

13:

Insert ti to Qj while minimizing the total distance

14:

if total distance of Qj exceeds dmax then
remove ti from Qj

15:

end if

16:
17:

end for

18:

for each target ti in Qj do
Yr (i) = 0

19:
20:

end for

21:

end for

22:

if {Q1 , ..., QR } collects more coins than Jbest then

23:
24:

update Jbest
end if

25:

end for

26:

return Jbest

27:

end procedure
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security game directly using the standard optimization formulation, enumerating all joint
patrolling paths directly on the full graph. We compare this to first applying our graph
abstraction method to the game, and then using the same solver to find the solution
to the abstracted graph. We compare the methods on both solution quality and runtime. To measure the amount of error introduced we introduce an error metric denoted by
epsilon() =

[Ud (c,a)−Ud0 (c,a)]
,
Ud (c,a)∗100

where Ud0 (c, a) is the expected payoff for defender when using

contraction and Ud (c, a) ≥ Ud0 (c, a).
For our experiments we used 100 randomly generated, 2-player security games intended
to capture the important features of green security games. Each game has 25 targets (nodes
in the graph). Payoffs for the targets are chosen uniformly at random from the range −10
to 10. The rewards for the defender or attacker are positive and the penalties are negative.
We set the distance constraint to 6. In the baseline solution, there is no contraction. For
different levels of abstraction the number of contracted nodes (#CN) varies between the
values: (0, 2, 5, 8, 10). Figure 4.4 shows us how contraction affects contraction time (CT),
solution time (ST) and reverse mapping time (RMT). CT only consider the contraction
procedure, ST considers the construction of the P matrix and the solution time for the
optimization problem, and RMT considers time to generate the P matrix for the original
graph from the solution to the abstracted game.

Figure 4.4: Effect of contraction on times CT, ST and RMT
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We first note that as the graph becomes more contracted ST takes much less time, as
shown in Figure 4.4. The next experimental result presented in Figure 4.5 shows how much
error is introduced as we increase the amount of contraction and the amount of time we
can save by using contraction.

Figure 4.5: Effect of contraction on Epsilon and runtime saved

4.6.2

Comparison of Solution Algorithms

We now present results comparing the solution quality and runtimes of different versions
of our solution algorithm on graph-based security games of increasing size. We focus on
grid-based graphs, which are typical of open-area patrolling problems like those in wildlife
protection domains. For the experiments we generated 20 sample games for each size of
game. For simplicity, the distance between every node and it’s neighbors is set to 1. The
patroller has two resources to conduct patrols in each case, and the distance constraint on
the paths varies depending on the game size.
All of the games are zero-sum. We randomly assign payoffs to the targets. In wildlife
protection, it is typical for there to be a relatively small number of areas with high densities
of animal/poaching activity. To reflect this low density of high-valued targets, we partition
the targets into high and low value types, with values uniformly distributed in the ranges
of [0, 4] and [8, 10], respectively. We assign 90% of the targets values from the low range,
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and 10% values from the high range.
We break down the runtime into three different components: 1) The time to contract
graphs, ContractionTime (CT), 2) The time to solve optimization problems, SolvingTime
(ST), and 3) the total runtime, TotalTime (TT). All runtimes are given in milliseconds.
EPd denotes the expected payoff for defender.
We compare out methods to two baselines that solve the original optimization problem
with no contraction by enumerating joint patrolling paths. The first one enumerates all
paths and directly solves the problem, while the second algorithm uses column generation
to iteratively add joint paths (but does not use contraction). All algorithms that use the
path sampling heuristic generate 1000 sample paths. We considered different combinations
of the heuristics for both the Single Oracle (SO) and Double Oracle (DO) formulations. In
Double Oracle, there are three modules where heuristic approaches can be used: 1) selecting
the initial set of targets for the restricted graph; 2) selecting initial paths for solving the
restricted graph; 3) in column generation, adding paths that can improve the solution for
the restricted graph. The first two modules are also needed in Single Oracle. We discuss
the heuristic approaches tested for these three modules. First, for selecting the initial set
of targets, we test GreedyCover1 (GC1) and GreedyCoverR (GCR). Second, for selecting
initial paths for the restricted graph, we enumerate all the paths (denoted as All paths) for
small scale problems. In addition, we test GreedyPathR (GPR) and GreedyPath3 (GP3).
When using GPR for selecting initial paths, we use target utility as the number of coins
on the targets. GreedyPath3 (GP3) initialize the set of paths by listing the shortest paths
from the base to a target and back to base for each target. Third, to add new paths in
column generation, we test GPR and random sampling of paths (denoted as sample path).
We present the runtime and solution quality data for our algorithms as we increase the
size of the game, considering game sizes of 25, 50, 100 and 200 targets. Table 4.1 4.2 4.3
and Table 4.4 show the results for each of these four cases, respectively. We had a memory
limitation of 16 GB, and many of the algorithms were not able to solve the larger problems
within this memory limit. We include only the data for algorithms that successfully solved
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Algorithm

#targets left

EPd

CT

ST

TT

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + GPR

13

6.759

2

11

69

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + GPR

14

5.8845

2

12

65

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + GPR

12

7.2095

3

22

44

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + GPR

10

7.1865

2

15

38

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + Sample Paths

14

7.481

2

14

165

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + Sample Paths

14

7.3955

2

14

205

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

14

7.605

3

97

267

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

14

7.587

2

99

283

SO + GC1 + IC + All paths + LP

12

7.702

1

105

632

SO + GCR + IC + All paths + LP

14

7.702

2

135

827

SO + GCR + IC + GP3 + LP

11

2.05

4

10
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No contraction + No column generation

25

7.702

0

1417 14140

No contraction + Column generation

25

7.702

0

1480 14661

Table 4.1: Performance comparison, #target=25 and dmax = 8
all of the sample games for a given size within the memory limit.
We note that the baseline algorithms are only able to solve the smallest games within
the memory limit. Even for these games, the single and double oracle methods using
abstraction are all dramatically faster, and many of the variations come close to finding
the optimal solutions. As we scale up the game size, the single oracle methods are not
able to solve the game within the memory limit. For the largest games, the double oracle
methods without sampled paths are still able to solve the problems to find good solutions,
and do so very quickly. The third and fourth variation consistently show the best overall
performance, with a good tradeoff between solution quality and speed.
We conduct a second experiment on large, 200-target graphs with the same distance
and resource constraints but a different distribution of payoffs. For this experiment we
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Algorithm

#targets left

EPd

CT

ST

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + GPR

30

5.018

9

1313 1981

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + GPR

29

5.8195

7

461

790

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + GPR

28

7.4945

14

187

292

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + GPR

27

7.6415

8

162

261

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + Sample Paths

30

5.794

9

280

4154

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + Sample Paths

29

6.4185

6

167

3925

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

20

6.8935

6

2194 4499

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

23

6.777

6

1570 4330

BA + GCR + IC + GP3 + LP

22

0.75

5

26

TT

1113

Table 4.2: Performance comparison, #target=50 and dmax = 20

Algorithm

#targets left

EPd

CT

ST

TT

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + GPR

51

6.5135

51

5753

8433

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + GPR

51

6.193

38

2170

3392

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + GPR

48

7.0545

52

766

1084

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + GPR

47

7.2435

37

659

1017

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + Sample Paths

50

6.098

46

1792 25017

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

20

5.4735

13

2200

4420

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + Sample Paths

30

5.0745

12

2596

5864

Table 4.3: Performance comparison, #target=100 and dmax = 29
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Algorithm

#targets left

EPd

CT

ST

TT

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + GPR

85

6.5355 345

10360 17904

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + GPR

83

6.501

287

5307

9657

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + GPR

72

6.551

270

2658

4156

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + GPR

70

6.656

189

2274

3603

Table 4.4: Performance comparison, #target=200 and dmax = 45
Algorithm

#remaining targets

EPd

CT

ST

TT

DO + GC1 + GPR + LP + GPR

44

8.621

110 8177 12363

DO + GCR + GPR + LP + GPR

43

8.6085

73

3796

5275

DO + GC1 + GP3 + LP + GPR

40

7.7445

96

595

906

DO + GCR + GP3 + LP + GPR

40

7.7075

70

721

1058

Table 4.5: Performance comparison with 3 partition in payoff, #target=200 and dmax =
45
have three payoff partitions, with the value ranges: [0, 1], [2, 8], [9, 10]. The ratio of target
values in these ranges is 80%, 10% and 10%, respectively. Table 4.5 shows the results. In
comparison with Table 4.5, the DO algorithms (especially variations 3 and 4) are even faster,
though in this case variation 1 and 2 do result in higher solution qualities. The distribution
of payoffs has a significant effect on the algorithm performance, and as expected, the DO
variations with abstraction are most effective when there is a relatively small fraction of
important targets and a large number of unimportant ones.
Next we present figures to visualize the runtime differences among different solution algorithms. Again, only algorithms that were able to complete within the memory bound are
shown. Figures 4.6a 4.6b and 4.6c show the TotalTime, ContractionTime and SolvingTime
comparison respectively among Double Oracle methods and Basic Abstraction Methods
with the baseline algorithms. The figures show the same patterns of scalability discussed
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previously.
Next, we visualize the solution quality of our proposed algorithms in comparison with
the baseline algorithms. The experiment setup is the same as the previous experiment.
Figure 4.7 shows that we were able to compare the solution quality properly for #target =
25 since the baseline algorithms were able to finish. The Basic Abstraction methods except
the one which uses GP3 were able to compute the exact solution. All of the Double Oracle
methods are suboptimal, but typically provide good approximations.
For the next experiments, we only used DO4, which we will mention as DO. We compare
the run time between SO, DO and the Baseline techniques in Figure 4.8a. It shows that
DO technique takes less time compared to others and for 200 targets SO and Baseline
were not able to find a solution because of out of memory exception. Figure 4.8b, 4.8c
shows that the DO technique produces expected utility almost as near as other optimal
and sub-optimal solvers with a very reasonable amount of time.
For the final experiments we used real world data. We test our algorithms on grid-based
graphs constructed from elevation and animal density information from a conservation area
in Southeast Asia. The area is discretized into a grid map with each grid cell of size 50m by
50m. The problem has a large number of targets and feasible patrol routes when considering
a practical distance limit constraint (often 5km-20km). We tested with four different game
sizes, and the result shows that the proposed algorithm can solve real-world scale GSGs
efficiently (see Table 4.6). Only DO4 was used for this experiment since it provides superior
performance than others. The payoff range for the targets were [0, 90].

4.7

Conclusion

Green security games are being used to help combat environmental crime by improving
patrolling strategies. However, the applications of GSG are still limited due to the computational barriers of solving large, complex games based on underlying graphical structures.
Existing applications require manual pre-processing to come up with suitably abstract
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(a) TotalTime(TT)

(b) ContractionTime(CT)

(c) SolvingTime(ST).

Figure 4.6: Runtime comparison among solvers.
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Figure 4.7: Solution quality evaluation

#targets

dmax

#remaining targets

EPd

CT

ST

TT

100

5000

56

25.83

121

303

789

200

8000

88

25.79

67

926

1678

500

15000

92

18.56

1928

1107

4403

1000

18000

100

16.29 12302 2072 18374

Table 4.6: Results of using abstraction in real world data
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(a) Runtime comparison among DO, SO and Baseline

(b) Expected utility comparison between Orienteering Problem (OP), Lexicographic
solution for OP with multiple resources (lexicoOP), Team orienteering problem with
multiple visitations (TOP) and Double Oracle (DO) solvers

(c) Runtime comparison between Orienteering Problem (OP), Lexicographic solution
for OP with multiple resources (lexicoOP), Team orienteering problem with multiple
visitations (TOP) and Double Oracle (DO) solvers

Figure 4.8: Runtime and Expected utility comparison among solvers.
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games that can be solved by existing solvers. We address this problem by designing the
first algorithm for solving graph-based security games that integrates automated abstraction techniques with strategy generation methods. Our algorithm is the first to be able to
provide high-quality solutions to very large green security games (thousands of nodes) in
seconds by exploiting the characteristic of the grid-based terrain by exploiting the sparseness of animal density. The algorithms will be potentially opening up many new applications of GSG while avoiding the need for some of the arbitrary, manual abstraction stages
when generating game models. With additional work to develop fast exact slave algorithms,
we should also be able to provide exact solutions using this approach to large GSG. We
also plan to investigate approximate slave formulations with performance bounds, using
abstraction to compute solution concepts from behavioral game theory such as quantal response equilibrium, and applying our algorithms to real-world applications in green security
games.
For my next chapter I move to a different domain, cyber security, where I explore a
different research question pertaining to partial independent network structures.
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Chapter 5
Subgame Abstraction and
Cyberdefense
5.1

Introduction

Most real-world networks are divided into subnets to increase performance and security,
but there are limited resources to inspect/harden devices against attacks. Automated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [120] [94] are an essential defense, but it may not be
possible to use a costly IDS on every network host [37]. In a network, botnets often spread
easily within a subnet using worms that exploit open ports and unpatched vulnerabilities.
However, spreading between subnets requires moving through more secure and highly monitored routers that limit connectivity. This locality leads a game model with a particular
structure in a Normal Form Game (NFG). We present a game-theoretic model based on
this cyberdefense scenario using an NFG for stopping the spread of an attacker (e.g., a botnet) through a network that has a subnet architecture. In this game model, the network
administrator acts as the defender and a worm acts as the attacker. The network administrator wants to use his defense mechanism to stop the spread of a botnet by hardening the
security in one or more hosts.
While NFG is a very general representation, it is often problematic to solve an NFG for
real-world scenarios because enumerating all possible strategies results in an extremely large
game. For example, in an enterprise network the large number of hosts and interconnections
can lead to intractable NFG models. Solving an NFG is known to be a computationally
hard problem [55], and most existing algorithms (e.g., implemented in Gambit [95]) do
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not scale well in practice. An increasingly common approach is to apply some form of
automated abstraction to simplify the game. The simplified game is then analyzed using
an available solver, and the solution is mapped back into the original game. If the reduced
game can retain the vital strategic features of the original game, then in principle the
solution of the simpler game may be a reasonable approximation of the solution to the
original game.
Two works very closely related to an NFG reduction are one by Conitzer et al. [52]
and another one by Bard et al. [38]. In the former paper, the authors gave an abstraction
technique which can be used in a class of NFGs called Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility (ALAGIU). The authors show that their technique can be applied recursively
in ALAGIU games to abstract the game and find approximate Nash equilibrium. Motivated by the approach, we introduce an abstraction technique we call Iterative Subgame
Abstraction and Solution Concept (ISASC). To evaluate this technique, we use a class of
NFGs where some actions give identical utility that we call Approximately Identical Outside
Subgames (AIOS). We also introduce a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium solution concept
called Minimum Epsilon Bound (MEB).
Our main contributions are as follows: (1) we model a cyberdefense scenario using
NFG that naturally leads to games with AIOS structure, (2) we offer sophisticated noniterative and iterative algorithms for solving games using abstraction with both exact and
noisy AIOS structure, (3) we present experimental evaluation of our algorithms on both
generic games and games based on a cyberdefense scenario, showing that our algorithms
substantially improve scalability over baseline equilibrium solution algorithms.

5.2

Games with AIOS Structure

A Normal Form Game (NFG) is a standard representation in game theory in which the
outcomes of all possible combinations of strategies are represented using a payoff matrix.
The tuple (N, A, u) represents a finite N -player NFG [114], where each player is indexed

47

by i. The set of actions (pure strategies) is given by A = A1 × ... × AN , where Ai is the
set of actions for player i. Each vector a = (a1 , ..., aN ) ∈ A is an action profile. An action
(kth) for player i is represented by ai,k . We extend to mixed strategies si ∈ Si , and use
the notation π i (ai ) to refer to the probability of playing action ai for player i. Each player
has a real-valued utility (payoff) function u = (u1 , ..., uN ) where ui : AN → R, extended to
mixed strategies as usual by using expected utility.
We will consider abstracted games represented as (simpler) NFGs. For these games, we
use the same notation but with a hat to denote that it is an abstracted game, (N̂ , Â, û).
We also use Ai (O) to refer to the set of available actions for player i in NFG O. The set of
clusters for player i is denoted using ci = {ci,1 , ..., ci,m }, where ci,m ⊂ Ai and ci,m is the mth
cluster for player i, and ci,m = {ai,1 , ..., ai,k }. Every action belongs to exactly one cluster,
so ci,1 ∩ ci,2 ∩ ... ∩ ci,k = ∅.
We now introduce a game
structure based on the idea of
forming subgames with strong interactions within a subgame, but
weak interactions outside of the
subgame. We call this Approximately Identical Outside Subgames
(AIOS), as shown in Figure 5.1.
The fundamental idea is to create
clusters of strategies for both players that form subgames. Within a
subgame, the strategies and payoffs can vary arbitrarily. However,

Figure 5.1: AIOS Structure in an NFG

outside of the subgame, the strategies for each player should have payoffs as similar as possible for playing against any opponent strategy, not in the subgame. Games with exact AIOS have identical payoffs outside
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the subgame, while games with noisy AIOS weaken this to allow some variation in the
payoffs outside the subgames.
In Figure 5.1, suppose the row player is player 1 and column player is player 2. If player
1 decides to play any strategy from {1 − 10} ∈ c1,1 , he needs to worry only about the
probabilities assigned by player 2 to strategies {1 − 10} ∈ c2,1 . Intuitively this is because
if player 2 plays from strategies outside of c2,1 the payoff is the same for the row player
no matter which action he chooses among {1 − 10} ∈ c1,1 . The subgame G1 is formed by
considering only actions in c1,1 and c2,1 .

5.3

A Cyber Defense Game with AIOS

Figure 5.2: Example network with ti,j = 1 and T (ηk , ηl ) = 0
We now present a cybersecurity scenario for a botnet attack where the AIOS (Section 5.2) structure arises naturally. Figure 5.2 shows an example with 2 subnets containing
3 nodes each. A network is a collection of nodes that belong to exactly 1 subnet ηk . Every host has a value vi . ti,j represents the intra-transmission probability for the botnet to
propagate from node i to j within the same subnetwork ηk . The inter-transmission probabilities, represented by T (ηk , ηl ), is for the botnet propagating from subnet ηk to ηl . The
botnet spreads on a new subnet ηl from current subnet ηk and infects the nodes of subnet
ηl like a worm maintaining the intra-transmission probabilities. We model a one-shot game
where the Defender selects a node i to defend (e.g., closing ports, patching vulnerabilities,
increasing monitoring). The defend action reduces the transmission probabilities for all
edges connected to i and stops any attack that spreads to node i. The attacker selects an
initial node to attack, which spreads according to the transmission probabilities (which can
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be estimated using simulation).
If the botnet spreads to a defended node and is detected, the Defender pays a cost
equal to the total value of the infected nodes (to clean up the attack), but the attacker
receives a payoff of zero. If the attack does not interact with a defended node, the attacker
receives the sum of the values of all the infected nodes. We estimate the payoff matrix for
a particular game using Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the spread of the infection for
each pair of strategies.

Figure 5.3: (a) Game for Figure 5.2 with ti,j = 1 and T (ηk , ηl ) = 0. (b) Game for Figure
5.2 with ti,j = [0.85, 1.0] and T (ηk , ηl ) = 0.10
Figure 5.3(a) shows the NFG representation for the example in Figure 5.2 assuming
ti,j = 1 and no edges exist between subnets. In this case, the game has an exact AIOS
structure. When the two players play on the same subnet, there is a strategically interesting game. However, when the two players play outside of the same subnets, there
is no interaction. Intuitively, this is because the Defender will never be able to detect
the Attacker’s botnet because no connection exists between subnets. Figure 5.3(b) shows
the network seen in Figure 5.2 with a low inter-transmission probability between subnets where T (ηk , ηl ) = 0.10 and transmission probabilities within the subnets in the range
ti,j = [0.85, 1.0]. When we add these weak interactions between subnets (i.e., relatively low
transmission probabilities), we have a game with an noisy AIOS structure where actions in
different subnets have only limited effects on the payoffs.
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5.4

Hierarchical Solution Method

We now describe a solution approach that constructs subgames based on strategy clusters
and uses the solutions to these subgames to create a more accurate abstracted game. When
games have exact AIOS structure, this will result in finding an exact solution to the original
game by composing the results of the subgame solutions. In cases where games have noisy
AIOS structure, we propose an iterative solution method that improves solution quality by
taking into account error from outside of the subgames.

5.4.1

Subgames

Consider the AIOS example shown in Figure 5.1. Ten subgames correspond to ten pairs of clusters of actions for the
players. For example, G1 is played using clusters c1,1 and
c2,1 . Now we consider building an abstracted game by first
solving each of the subgames G1 to G10 utilizing any solution concept to get a mixed strategy for each player in each
game. The abstracted game will have one action for each

Figure 5.4: Abstracted (hierarchical) Game R

player corresponding to each cluster (10 in the example). To
fill in the payoffs for each pair of clusters (a 10x10 matrix),
we compute the expected payoffs using the mixed strategies for the corresponding clusters
(for the subgames, this is the expected payoff from the solution to the game). Figure 5.4
shows the resulting abstracted game R. Next, we solve R using any solution concepts mentioned in section 5.4.3. To get the reverse mapping here we must distribute the probabilities
of c1,1 , c1,2 , ..., c1,10 over all the actions in c1,1 , c1,2 , ..., c1,10 for player 1 to get the strategy
for the original game (resp. for player 2). Equation 5.1 gives this reverse mapping, where
i ∈ N, ∀ai,k ∈ ci,m . In equation 5.1 the probabilities π i (ai,k ) on the right-hand side are
the mixed strategies for the subgames. We call this approach Subgame Abstraction and
Solution Concept (SASC).

51

π i (ai,k ) = π i (ci,m ) × π i (ai,k )

5.4.2

(5.1)

Noisy AIOS Games

The AIOS structure is strict if we require identical payoffs outside of the subgames. However, it is much more plausible to find approximate forms of this structure. For example,
in Section 5.3 we saw how low transmission probabilities between subnets lead to an noisy
AIOS game. For a noisy version of AIOS, we define the delta (δ) parameter to specify how
much variation in the payoffs is allowed outside of the subgames. Let δi,k be the maximum
payoff difference for any pair of actions in cluster k for player i for any strategy of the of
the opponent that is not in the same subgame. δi is the maximum of δi,k for player i, where
k can be from 1 to a number of clusters. Equation 5.2 picks the maximum δ considering
all of the clusters and players. Equation 5.3, where (i, j) ∈ N, i 6= j, calculates δ for one
cluster ci,k for a player i.

δ = maxi∈N (max(δi,k )),

k = 1, ..., |Âi (R)|

δi,k = max(ui (ai,m , aj,t ) − ui (ai,n , aj,t ))

5.4.3

(5.2)

(5.3)

Solving Games

We consider several solution methods for solving games. We consider both pure and mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium, as well as a different concept that directly minimizes the bound
on the approximation quality in the original game.
Approximate Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
In a Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) all players play pure strategies that are
mutual best-responses. However, PSNE is not guaranteed to exist. Therefore, we instead
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look for the pure-strategy outcome that is the best approximate equilibrium. We first
calculate the values of deviations for each action ai and then select the action profile that
minimizes the maximum benefit to deviating.
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We also calculate a version of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium using the software package
Gambit [95]. There are several different solvers for finding Nash equilibria in this toolkit.
We used one based on Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) [67].
Minimum Epsilon Bounded Equilibrium
When solving an abstracted game, the best analysis may not be finding a Nash Equilibrium,
since this may not be an equilibrium of the original game. As an alternative, we introduce
Minimum Epsilon (ε) Bounded equilibrium (MEB). Instead of considering deviations to
clusters of actions (and the average payoff of the cluster), we use the maximum expected
payoff for any of the actions in the original game. This heuristic allows for a better estimate
of how close the outcome will be to an equilibrium in the original game. The difference in
comparison with PSNE is in the calculation of ε(a∗i ). Equation 5.4 is used to compute the
ε for MEB.

ε(â∗i ) = max∀âi ∈Âi ,âj ∈Âj [ui (âi , âj ) − ûi (â∗i , âj )]

(5.4)

In the above equation ui (âi , âj ) returns a payoff from an upper bound game R. Payoffs
for the upper-bounded game R are computed using Equation 5.5. Equation 5.5 calculates
the maximum expected payoff for an abstracted action by reverse mapping to the original
actions and calculating the expected payoff for every original action, selecting the maximum
one. Next, where ∀âi ∈ Âi (R), ∀aˆj ∈ Âj (R), (i, j) ∈ N, i 6= j, the equation iterates over
all the actions for every player and calculates the payoffs for the upper-bounded game R.
Equation 5.4 cannot be used in the original game because we need an upper-bounded game
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where we use reverse mapping. Unless we have an abstracted game, it is not possible to
compute an upper-bounded game.
P
ui (âi , aˆj ) = max∀ai,k ∈g(âi )

∀aj,l ∈g(âj )

ui (ai,k , aj,l )

|g(âj )|

(5.5)

Double Oracle Algorithm
The Double Oracle (DO) is not a solution concept. It is a technique used to handle
massive games. Double Oracle Algorithms [43] [96] utilize the method of column/constraint
generation. The idea is to restrict the strategies of all the players and solve the restricted
game exactly using the LP [114] for solving an NFG. We used the QRE [67] [95] to solve
the restricted general-sum NFG. The QRE gives an approximate Nash Equilibrium.
Counter Factual Regret
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) [128] is an iterative algorithm to find approximate Nash Equilibrium. In every iteration, it updates the strategies of the players to
minimize a weighted sum of regret at each decision. The average strategies then approach
NE.

5.4.4

Iterative Solution Algorithm

For games with noisy AIOS structure, simply composing (as above) the solutions of the
subgames may not be an equilibrium of the original game. The solution may occasionally
play in quadrants of the game that are not one of the subgames solved explicitly, which
results in an error when the payoffs do not match identically. We now introduce an iterative
solution technique that (partially) accounts for this error. After solving the subgames and
abstracted game as previously, we now calculate the expected payoff for each strategy
outside its subgame. Then, we modify the subgames using this error term added to the
payoffs in the subgame and solve them again, and then recalculate the abstracted game
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and solve it again. This process results in a sequence of modified solutions that account
for the differences in payoffs outside of the subgames from the previous iteration. We call
this algorithm the Iterative Subgame Abstraction and Solution Concept (ISASC).
Consider the subgame G1 in Figure 5.1. We want to internalize the noise outside of the
subgame into the payoffs of the subgame. So, before solving G1 , we update the payoffs for
both player 1 and player 2. For action {1 − 10} ∈ c1,1 , we calculate the expected utility
when player 2 does not play the actions in the subgame. That means that when player 1
plays {1 − 10}, we calculate the expected utility of {1 − 10}, denoted Ωi , by considering the
probabilities of player 2 playing {11−100} from the strategy on the previous iteration. Then
we update the payoffs of G1 for player 1 for action {1 − 10} ∈ c1,1 for every {1 − 10} ∈ c2,1
by adding the Ωi . This process repeats for all strategies in the game.
Pseudocode for updating the subgames is shown in Algorithm 5. Subgames are updated
using [ui (ai , aj ) = ui (ai , aj ) + Ωi (ai )], where ∀ai ∈ Ai (G), ∀aj ∈ Aj (G), ∀(i, j) ∈ N, i 6= j,
line 4-12. Lines 5-7 are used to compute the expected payoff Ωi , for an action of player i,
when player j plays outside of the subgame G. The action set for player i in game G is
Ai (G). The probability of action aj from the mixed strategy for iteration T − 1 is πT −1 (aj ).

5.5

Experiments

In the experiment section, we used two criteria to measure the performance of our proposed
algorithm: (a) runtime (b) epsilon ().  measures whether there is an incentive for a
player to switch to another pure strategy from the current Nash Equilibrium strategy
(which can be either a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium using QRE or a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium using PSNE, MEB). To compute  of an approximate Nash Equilibrium
strategy for player i first we calculate the expected payoff of player i given the approximate
Nash Equilibrium strategy of the players. Next, we check whether there is an incentive
for player i to switch to a pure strategy from the current approximate Nash Equilibrium
strategy (which can be either pure or a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium). Finally, we
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Algorithm 5 Update Subgame Algorithm
Input: Subgame G’, original game G, player i
1:

Subgame actions o’ = Actions(G’, i)

2:

Opponent actions in G’, p = Actions(G, G’, iop )

3:

Opponent actions outside G’, p’ = OutActions(G, G’, iop )

4:

for j ← 1, o0 do

5:
6:

for k ← 1, p0 do

end for

8:

for l ← 1, p do

10:
11:
12:

. for every action of opponent 6∈ G’

ω = ω + PayOff(j,k,G) ×π(k)

7:

9:

. for every action of player i in G’

. for every action of opponent in G’

Outcome o = [ j, l ]
G’(o,i) = PayOff(G, o) + ω

. update the payoff in G’

end for
end for

take the maximum of all the players’  which gives us the  for an approximate Nash
Equilibrium. In a Nash Equilibrium, there is no incentive to switch to a pure strategy
for all the participating players ( = 0). Our next experiments will also evaluate how
much scalability we can manage if we take advantage of the AIOS game structure, which
corresponds to our research question 1.
For our first experiment we considered 2-player games of different sizes ( #Actions =
25, 36, 64, 81, 100) with a fixed δ = 10. For each size, we created 20 different games. For each
size, the strategies for each player are partitioned into 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 clusters with 5, 6, 8, 9, 10
actions respectively. The subgames are completely random games with payoffs generated
uniformly between 0 and 100. The payoffs outside of the subgames are generated randomly
with the constraint that in every cluster the maximum payoff difference between the payoffs
for the actions is δ for all actions of the opponent that are not part of the subgame (i.e.,
for every action outside the subgames we add noise).
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(a) Measuring performance against QRE, CFR
and DO which are applied in the original game

(b) Decreasing  for different δ

Figure 5.5: Measuring performance of ISASC-QRE
We begin by showing that ISASC has benefits when there are limited resources available since ISASC can solve a large game using fewer resources and much more quickly.
We compare the runtime performance of ISASC-QRE (ISASC-QRE means we used the
ISASC algorithm to solve games where QRE is used to solve the subgames and the hierarchical games) against different solution methods: QRE, CFR and DO, when these different
methods are applied to the original game without the use of any abstraction as shown in
Figure 5.5a. The results clearly show that ISASC-QRE was able to solve games faster than
QRE, CFR and DO by considerable margins.
Our next experiment focuses on showing that the iteration scheme in ISASC-QRE is
effective at improving solution quality. For this experiment we created 20 2-player games
for each δ = {5, 15, 20, 30} where 100 actions were available for each player. In Figure 5.5b
we show the error (quantified by the  in the original game) for different levels of δ as we
increase the number of iterations. We can see a clear improvement in solution quality with
increasing iterations. We also note that the biggest improvements come in the cases with
the largest values of δ.
The next experiment compares the solution quality of iterative (ISASC) and noniterative (SASC) subgame abstraction techniques: ISASC-QRE, SASC-PSNE, SASC-QRE,
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(a) Comparison of solution quality

(b) Comparison of runtime

Figure 5.6: Performance comparisons for ISASC and SASC algorithms
SASC-MEB. For each algorithm, we explicitly mentioned which solution concept is used
to solve the subgames and hierarchical games. For example, in SASC-QRE, we used the
QRE to solve the subgames and the hierarchical games. The only exception is SASCMEB, where we used QRE to solve the subgames since MEB can only be used to solve
a hierarchical/abstract game.

For this experiment, we created 20 2-player games for

each δ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30} where 100 actions were available for each player.
The strategies for each player are partitioned into 10 clusters with 10 actions for each:
|c1 | = |c2 | = 10, |c1,m | = 10, m = 1, 2, ..., 10. For this experiment, we assumed that the
subgames are known to ISASC and SASC algorithms. Figure 5.6a 5.6b shows the results.
ISASC-QRE and SASC-QRE does very well in cases with low δ, as expected. However,
ISASC-QRE continues to perform better when the values of δ are much more significant.
Figure 5.6a 5.6b also show that there is a tradeoff between solution quality and runtime.
ISASC-QRE produces the better results but requires more time than SASC-QRE. Overall,
the results clearly shows that AIOS games can be highly exploited to achieve a scalable
game model using our ISASC algorithm.
We now consider the more realistic cyber defense games described in Section 5.3. In
these experiments we compared our ISASC and SASC algorithms. This section shows that
by taking into account the subnet structure, since we know the subnets in advance, our
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Parameter Value range
ti,j = tj,i

[70, 100]

T (ηi , ηj )

[10, 30]

vi

[6, 10]

cd (vi )

[1, 3]

ca (vi )

[1, 3]

|eηk , eηl |

1

|eηk |

|emin , emax |

Table 5.1: Network settings
ISASC and SASC can generate high quality abstracted game model which we can solve
using limited computational resources e.g. home computers. For these experiments we did
not use any GPU or high performance computational resource. We generated 20 games
using the parameter settings shown in Table 5.1. Each parameter is drawn uniformly from
the given range. The number of edges in subnet ηl is |eηl | in the range |emin , emax | where
emin and emax are the minimum and maximum number of edges respectively. All networks
are connected, and the parameters T (ηk , ηl ) and ti,j , where ti,j >> T (ηk , ηl ) control worm
propagation. We use Monte Carlo simulation for 10, 000 iterations to estimate the payoffs
based on the propagation of the attack. Each subnet forms a cluster of actions for our
solution methods. Since we already know the subnets for this cyber defense scenario, and
thus the subgames, we assumed that the subgames are already known.
Our first experiment shows how δ varies as we vary the inter and intra-transmission
probability in Figure 5.7a,5.7b. We used games with 50 nodes and 5 subnets with the same
number of nodes. We can see in Figure 5.7a that when ti,j = [100, 100] and T (ηk , ηl ) = 0
so the subnets are totally disconnected from each other δ = 0. In this case, we can find
an exact equilibrium by composing subgame solutions. However, when T (ηk , ηl ) starts to
increase δ increases. In both Figure 5.7a and Figure 5.7b, we see that δ reaches a maximum
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(a) Impact: T (ηk , ηl ) on δ

(b) Impact: ti,j on δ

Figure 5.7: Effect of transmission parameters on δ

(a) #node and #subnet vs 

(b) Subnet size vs 

Figure 5.8: Performance of ISASC-QRE
when T (ηk , ηl ) ≈ ti,j as the spreading of botnet becomes random across the entire network,
losing the AIOS structure.
Next, we show how δ and  change when we vary both network size and subnet size.
In Figure 5.8a we can see that ISASC-QRE performs favorably compared to the other
solution algorithms. Next, we increase subnet size but keep the number of subnets fixed.
Figure 5.8b shows that as the subnet size increases δ increases. However, the ISASC
algorithm continues to provide better solution quality with very low  for higher δ. In all
of the experiments, ISASC gives very high solution quality compared to other algorithms.
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5.6

Conclusion

Defending a network against malicious worm requires sophisticated defense mechanism.
However, due to large network size and limited resources, it’s difficult for a network administrator to harden the security in every host of the network. Solving the game becomes
harder due to large action space of the game model. We propose a new class of abstraction methods for NFG based on the AIOS structure. We show that there exist several
abstraction-based solution methods that can take advantage of the subnet structure to
quickly find solutions to huge games by decomposing them into subgames. For games
with only noisy AIOS structure, we show that iterative solution methods can give us very
high-quality approximations to the solution of the original game.
Next, I move to the cyber deception domain where honeypots are used to lure the
attacker away from real machines and to learn about his behavior and TTP. However, since
the attackers are becoming smarter everyday, static honeypot becomes futile to defend the
security of a network. In the next chapter I introduce a game theoretic framework where
a defender strategically allocate honeypots in a dynamic fashion to achieve his objective.
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Chapter 6
Attacker Type Detection
6.1

Introduction

A great deal of effort is devoted to detecting the presence of cyber attacks, so that defenders can respond to protect the network and mitigate the damage of the attack. Going
beyond detection, identifying in as much detail as possible what specific type of attacker
the defender is facing (e.g., what their goals, capabilities, and tactics are) can lead to even
better defensive strategies and may be able to help with eventual attribution of attacks.
However, attackers may wish to avoid both detection and identification, blending in or
appearing to be a different type of attacker. We present a game-theoretic approach for optimizing defensive deception actions (e.g., honeypots) with the specific goal of identifying
specific attackers as early as possible in an attack. We present case studies showing how
this approach works, and initial simulation results from a general model that captures this
problem. Next, we present a scalable version of the algorithm by reducing the actions space
considering domain knowledge and other heuristics. Our initial experiments show that the
scalable version performs reasonably well compared to the non-scalable version.
Cyber attackers pose a serious threat to economies, national defense, critical infrastructure, and financial sectors [23, 6, 4]. Early detection and identification of a cyber attacker
can help a defender to make better decisions to mitigate the attack. However, identifying
the characteristics of an attacker is challenging as they may employ many defense evasion
techniques [15]. Adversaries may also mask their operations by leveraging white-listed tools
and protocols [118, 122].
There are many existing intrusion detection methods to detect attacks [122, 101]. We
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focus here on using honeypot (HP) for detection and identification, though our models
could be extended to other types of defensive actions. HP are systems that are designed to
attract adversaries [116, 81] and to monitor [101] attacker activity so that the attack can
be analyzed (usually manually by experts). There are works on automating the analysis
process [107] using host based and network based data for correlation to identify a pattern.
Deductive reasoning can be used to draw conclusions about the attacker [108].
Most current approaches focus on detection during an ongoing attack, possibly with
some effort to categorize different types of detections. More detailed identification is done
during later forensic analysis. Here we focus on formally modeling what types of actions the
defender can take to support more detailed attacker identification early in the attack chain,
allowing more information to target specific defensive responses. This can be challenging;
for example many different attackers may use the same core malware toolkits and common
tactics [20, 6, 4, 5]. Attackers may intentionally try to look similar to other actors, and
may even change during the course of an attack (e.g., when compromised resources are sold
to other groups), leading to a complete change in focus [7, 23, 27].
We focus our model on detecting an attacker type early. An attacker type is defined by
an Attack Graph (AG) specific to that attacker that describes his possible actions and goals
in planning an attack campaign. An AG represents the set of attack paths that an attacker
can take to achieve their goal in the target network [54]. Depending on the observed network
and the exploits they have available, the attacker tries to choose the optimal sequence of
attack actions to achieve their particular goal. Identification of different attack types in
our model corresponds to identifying which of a set of possible attack graphs this particular
attacker is using in a particular interaction. The defender chooses deception actions that try
to force the attackers into choices that will reveal which type they are early on, which can
then inform later defenses. We propose a multi-stage game theoretic model to strategically
deploy honeypots to force the attacker to reveal his type early. We present case studies to
show how this model works for realistic scenarios, and to demonstrate how attackers can be
identified using deception. Finally, we present a general model, a basic solution algorithm,
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and simulation results that show that if the defender uses pro-active deception the attacker
type can be detected early compared to if he only observes the activity of an attacker.
Finally, we use some heuristics considering domain knowledge to reduce the action space
to a reasonable amount to make the algorithm more scalable. Our experiments show that
using heuristics improves the scalability of the algorithm by reasonable margins.

6.2

Background

AGs represents sequential attacks by an attacker to compromise a network or a particular computer [54]. AGs can
be automatically generated using a known vulnerabilities
database [73, 103]. Due to resource limitations, the automatically generated AGs are often used to identify high priority
vulnerabilities to fix [111, 102]. We use AGs as a library of attack plans that can represent different attackers. The optimal
plan for any attacker will depend on his particular options and
goals, reflected in the AG. The AG for each attacker will also
change depending on the network, including changes made by

Figure 6.1: A general Attack Graph (AG).

the defender (e.g., introducing honeypots). We model a multistage Stackelberg Security game (SSG)with a leader and a follower. The defender commits
to a strategy considering the attacker’s strategy. The attacker observes the strategy of the
leader and chooses an optimal attack strategy using the AG. The AG of the attackers we
considered are defined by initial access and lateral movement actions [16] to reach their
corresponding goal node gi as shown in Figure 6.1. Initial access represents the vectors an
attacker uses to gain an initial foothold in the network. We consider the technique called
Exploit Public-Facing Application [19] for initial access, where an attacker uses tools to
exploit the weakness of the public facing systems. Lateral movement is a tactic to achieve
greater control over network assets. We consider the example of Exploitation of Remote
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Services technique for lateral movement [22] where an attacker exploits the vulnerabilities
of a program. While there may be similarities in the AG for different attackers, having
different goals and options available mean that the plans may eventually diverge. The
overlap between multiple attack plans is the number of actions that are identical at the
start of the plan.

6.3

Case Studies

We present three case studies that consider different types of attackers. We look at different
pairs of attackers based on what exploits are shared between them and whether their final
objective is the same or not. We use the network shown in Figure 6.2, where a router is
Ri , a host is Hi , a firewall is Fi , a switch is S. An exploit φi (c) with cost c on an edge
allows an attacker to move laterally if an attacker ai has exploit φi (c). The cost of using an
exploit represents both the time and effort as well as the risk of detection which attackers
want to minimize.
An attacker tries to reach a
goal by making lateral movements
using an attack plan with the minimum cost. If there is more than
one minimum cost plan, attackers choose the ones that maximize
the overlap with other attackers.
We assume that when an attacker
reaches his goal the game ends. He
also has complete knowledge (e.g.
vulnerabilities) about the network,

Figure 6.2: Network for case study.

but does not know which nodes are
honeypots.
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(a) Before deception

(b) After deception

Figure 6.3: Case study 1. Attack plans of the attackers a1 and a2 before (a) and after
deception (b)
For each case study we first analyze the attack plans based on the AGs. Then we analyze
what proactive deceptive action a defender can take to detect the attacker type earlier. We
assume that the attacks are fully observable. Since we are interested in scenarios where
attackers have common attack plans in their AG, we assume that host H1 is where all
attackers initially enter the network.

6.3.1

Case Study 1: Attackers with Same Exploits but Different
Goals

We consider two attackers a1 and a2 with the set of exploits φ1 , φ2 , φ5 , φ6 . Goal nodes for
the attackers are defined by g(a1 ) = DB and g(a2 ) = W . The attack plans are shown in
Figure 6.3a. The defender cannot distinguish which attacker he is facing until the attacker
reaches to his goal node. Here, the defender can use a decoy node of either the DB or the
W to reduce the overlap in the attack plans by a1 and a2 . Since both of the attackers have
the same set of exploits a defender cannot use any decoy node with vulnerabilities. The
attackers have different goals and the defender can take advantage of that situation.
Figure 6.3b shows the use of a decoy DB (with dotted line) between H1 and R2 with
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unique exploits on the edges to force only the targeted attacker to go through the decoy.
Since other attackers will not use that plan, this creates a unique attack plan that can be
identified. In Figure 6.3b, we notice that if the acting attacker is a1 , then he will go for the
decoy DB. Attacker a1 does not take the longer path to compromise the DB because he
chooses attack plan with minimum cost. To maximize the overlapping attack plan attacker
a2 will choose the plan through the decoy DB instead of R1 even though the two plans
costs the same. In the next case studies, the defender avoids using goal node as decoy to
reduce the cost associated with the decoy server.

6.3.2

Case Study 2: Attackers With Shared Exploits And Different Goals

Now we consider attacker a1 with exploits (φ1 , φ2 , φ5 , φ6 ) and g(a1 ) = DB. Attacker a3
has exploits φ1 , φ2 , φ6 , φ7 and g(a3 ) = W . The attackers a1 and a3 compute attack plans as
shown in the Figure 6.4a. If the defender just observes, he will be able to detect the acting
attacker after R2 . Since the attackers have shared and unique exploits in their possession,
these create a non-overlapping path in the middle of their attack sequence, which causes
the defender to detect the differentiation between the attackers’ attack plans.
However, if the defender uses a honeypot HP as shown in Figure 6.4b the attack
sequence of the attackers changes. Attacker a1 cannot go through the HP due to his
lack of exploit φ7 (2.5) which causes the attackers to diverge at an earlier stage facilitating
identification by the defender.

6.3.3

Case Study 3: Attackers with Shared Exploits but Same
Goals

Now we consider attacker a4 with exploits (φ1 , φ2 , φ5 , φ6 , φ7 ) and g(a4 ) = W and for a5
exploits (φ1 , φ4 , φ7 , φ8 ), g(a5 ) = W . The attack plans are shown in Figure 6.5a. Attacker
a4 and a5 executes the exact same attack plan. Even though attacker a4 could go directly
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(b) After deception

(a) Before deception

Figure 6.4: Case study 2. Attack plans of the attackers a1 and a3 before (a) and after
deception (b)
to F3 from R2 he chooses the plan to through R3 minimize the chance of getting type
detected. Here, the defender has zero probability to differentiate the attackers.
The defender cannot use any honeypot at the initial stage as in case study 1 or 2
since those will not make any difference in the attackers plan. However, if the defender
deploys a honeypot HP as shown in the Figure 6.5b, the attackers choose the plans with
the minimum costs which leads to an earlier identification for the defender.

6.4

Game Model

We now present a general game-theoretic framework to model the interactions between the
defender and the attacker. There is a network with nodes ti ∈ T similar to an enterprise
network shown in the Figure 6.2. Each node ti ∈ T has a value vti and a cost cti . Some
nodes are public nodes which can be used to access the network. There are goal nodes
gj ⊂ T (e.g. DB) which are high valued nodes. Each node ti ∈ T has some vulnerabilities
that can be exploited using φti ∈ Φ on the edges. A node ti can be compromised from a
node tj using the exploit φti if there is an edge from tj to node ti and if node tj allows
the use of the exploit φti and if an attacker has any of the φti exploits. The game has N
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(a) Before deception

(b) After deception

Figure 6.5: Case study 3. Attack plans of the attackers a4 and a5 before (a) and after
deception (b)
attacker types ai and one defender d. The attackers have complete knowledge about the
network and have single deterministic policies π(ai ) to reach their goals and some exploits
φai ∈ Φ. However, he does not know whether a node is a honeypot or not. The defender
can deploy deception by allocating honeypot h ∈ H in the network. The configurations of
the honeypots are chosen randomly from real nodes T in the network.
The game starts by choosing an attacker type ai randomly. In round r, the defender
knows the history up to round r − 1, which is used to update the defender’s belief about
attacker type. Next, the defender allocates k honeypots to force the attacker to reveal his
type earlier. The defense actions also may thwart the plan of the attacker of reaching the
goal if the attacker moves laterally to a honeypot or if the attacker does not find any plan
to move laterally.
The network change is visible to the attacker in the current round. This can be justified
because an APT usually performs reconnaissance again and monitors defender activity
after making a lateral movement. The attacker recomputes his attack plan using his AG
and chooses an optimal attack plan with the minimum cost from his current position to
reach his goal. If there are multiple plans with the same cost, we break the tie in favor of
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the attacker where the attackers have the maximum common overlapping length in their
attack plans. The game ends if the attacker gets caught by the deception set up by the
defender or if he reaches to his goal node.

6.5

Defender Decision Making

In each round of the game the defender updates his beliefs about the attacker types and
the attackers’ goals. According to Bayes’ theorem, given the sequence of lateral movement
seq(t) up to node t from the starting node tp , the probability that the defender is facing
attacker ai is:
p(seq(t)|ai )p(ai )
PN
j=0 p(seq(t)|aj )p(aj )

p(ai |seq(t)) =

where p(ai ) is the prior probability of facing the attacker ai and p(seq(t)|ai ) is the
likelihood of the observation seq(t) given that we are facing the attacker ai . Given the
sequence of lateral movement seq(t) up to node t and the attacker type ai , the probability
that the plan of the attacker is Pg from the start node tp is:

p(Pg |seq(t), ai ) =

P

p(seq(t)|Pg ,ai )p(Pg ,ai )
p(seq(t)|Pg ,ai )p(Pg ,ai )

∀g∈G

Next, the defender considers all the possible deception deployments c ∈ C where there
are edges tm → tn from the attacker’s last observed position tlp where tm can be reached
from node tlp . Without affecting the existing connections of the network deceptions are
deployed between two nodes. The defender has a library of AGs for each of the attackers
which he can use to optimize the decision making. We consider three possible objectives
the defender can use to make this decision:
Minimizing Maximum Overlapping Length
The defender chooses his deception deployment by minimizing the sum of the attackers’
overlapping actions. Another variation would be to minimize attacker’s maximum overlap70

ping length with other attackers by considering each of the attackers.
Minimizing Expected Overlapping Length
Minimizing the maximum overlapping length of attack plans may not always focus on all
the attackers’ attack plans, e.g. if all the attackers have high overlapping (of attack plans)
with each other except the acting attacker. Here, the defender can compute the expected
overlapping length of the attack plans.
Minimizing Entropy
According to information theory one way to reduce the anonymity between the attacker
types is to deploy deception in such a way which will minimize the entropy. If X1 = p(a0 ),
X2 = p(a1 ) and X3 = p(a2 ) are three random variables for the attacker types where
P
X1 + X2 + X3 = 1, then entropy can be written as follows: H(X) = − i=1
i=0 p(ai ) logb p(ai )
where p(ai ) is the posterior probability for the attacker ai . For the defender’s action the
defender chooses the deception deployment which results in the minimum entropy for all
the attackers A.

6.6

Attacker Decision Making

Now we present the mixed integer program (MIP) for an attacker, where he chooses the
minimum cost plan to reach his goal. Ties are broken by choosing a plan which maximizes
the sum of common overlapping length of the attack plans.

max

X

dij

(6.1)

ij

0 ≤ dij −

me
X

dijme ≤ 0 ∀i, j

0
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(6.2)

dijme ≤ eiem AN D dijme ≤ ejem

dijme ≤ dij(m−1)e

X

∀i, j, m, e

∀i, j, e, m = 1, 2, ..., M

eiem ce ≤ Ci

∀i

(6.3)

(6.4)

(6.5)

em

X
m

X
m

eiem −

X

eie(m−1) −

∀i, ∀t

(6.6)

eie0 m = 0 ∀i, ∀t, t 6= s, t 6= g

(6.7)

eie0 m

m

X





1
if s ∈ e



= −1 if g ∈ e





0
otherwise

m

Equation 6.1 is the objective function where the attacker computes the maximum sum
of overlapping length of attack plans among all the attackers. Constraint 6.2 assigns the
sum of the overlapping length between attacker i, j up to move m into dij . In dijme e is the
edge identifier. Constraint 6.3 computes the overlapping length between the attacker plans
where eiem is a binary variable for attacker i representing an edge for edge e (subscript)
at mth move. Constraint 6.4 makes sure that the overlapping starts from the beginning
of the plans and not in the middle; if two plans start out differently but merges in the
middle somewhere. Constraint 6.5 ensures that each attacker chooses a minimum cost plan
to reach the goal node. Constraint 6.6 6.7 are path flow constraints for attackers.

6.7

Simulation Results

We want to show that using proactive deception a defender can reveal the attacker type
earlier than otherwise. We define an early identification as when the defender is able to
use proactive deception to determine the attacker type in an earlier round compared to
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when the defender just observes. Vulnerabilities in the nodes are (indirectly) represented
by exploits on the edge between two nodes.
We randomly generated 20 networks, somewhat similar to Figure 6.2, with 18 nodes
with values and costs chosen randomly from the range [0, 10] including one public node. We
considered exploits φ0 , φ1 , φ2 , φ3 , φ4 , φ5 with cost chosen randomly from the range [0, 10].
Next, we assign exploits to the edges in such a way that it allows the attackers to have
unique attack plans to their goals except the starting node. Depending on the edge density
(number of edges from a node) and shared vulnerability parameters we randomly connect
edges with exploits between nodes where the two nodes are in different attack plans of
different attackers. We used six honeypots and the vulnerabilities are picked from randomly
chosen nodes existing in the network so that the honeypots can act as decoys. The games
are limited to five rounds. In each round r the defender d deploys 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 decoys. In
the attack plan library, we considered three attacker types, a, b, c with different goals.
In the first experiment, we show that depending on different density of edges and shared
vulnerabilities between nodes, how early a defender can identify the attacker type he is
facing varies. Each of the three attackers, a, b, c has some unique and some shared exploits
in their possession. Attacker a has exploits φ0 , φ1 , φ2 . Attacker b has φ2 , φ3 , φ1 . Attacker c
has exploits φ4 , φ5 , φ2 . We picked the attacker b as the acting attacker.
Figure 6.6 shows the results. In the first row in Figure 6.6a 6.6b 6.6c defender just
observes the attacker actions. As the density and shared vulnerabilities increases it takes
more rounds for the defender to identify the attacker type b. In the second row in 6.6e 6.6f
the defender deploys honeypots. If we compare the figures of the same edge density and
shared vulnerabilities from the two rows it is easy to notice that use of deception facilitates
early identification except Figure 6.6d where it was the same. However, an increase in edge
density and shared vulnerabilities between nodes harms performance.
The second experiment is the same as the first except that we kept the edge density
and shared vulnerabilities between nodes fixed to 40% and we varied the shared exploits
between the attackers. We chose the attacker c as the acting attacker. We can observe in
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(a) Edge density and shared vul- (b) Edge density and shared vul- (c) Edge density and shared vulnerabilities 20%

nerabilities 40%

nerabilities 80%

(d) Edge density and shared vul- (e) Edge density and shared vul- (f) Edge density and shared vulnerabilities 20%

nerabilities 40%

nerabilities 80%

Figure 6.6: Comparison between just observation (first row) and use of pro-active deception
(second row). The shared exploits are fixed to 40% between attackers.
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(a) Unique exploits for the at- (b) 40% shared exploits between (c) All attackers have the same
tackers

attackers

set of exploits

(d) Unique exploits for the at- (e) 40% shared exploits between (f) All attackers have the same
tackers

attackers

set of exploits

Figure 6.7: Comparison between just observation (first row) and use of pro-active deception
(second row) We increase shared exploits between the attackers. The edge density and
shared vulnerabilities between nodes are fixed to 40%.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.8: Comparison between different techniques used by the defender.
Figure 6.7a 6.7b 6.7c that as we increase the sharing of exploits between the attackers it
takes longer for the defender to identify the attacker type c. When all the attackers have the
same exploits the defender was unable to identify the attacker type even at around 4 without
using any deception. However, in the second row in Figure 6.7d 6.7e 6.7f as the defender
strategically uses deception, identification of attacker c happens earlier. The performance
of the early identification decreases as the shared exploits between the attacker’s increases.
Another observation is noticeable in Figure 6.7d: the defender was not able to identify the
attacker type, however, the attacker did not find any policy to continue its attack. This
shows that the use of strategical deception can also act as a deterrent for the attackers.
For our last experiment, we compared different techniques a defender can use to facilitate
early identification; minimizing maximum overlap: min-max-overlap, minimizing maximum
expected overlap: min-max-exp-overlap and minimizing entropy: min-entropy. Data are
averaged for all the attacker types we considered. Figure 6.8a 6.8b show on average how
many rounds it took for the defender to identify the attackers using different techniques. In
both figures, we can see that using deception facilitates earlier identification. We did not
notice any particular difference between different techniques except when all the attackers
have the same exploits, and in that case min-max-overlap performed better. From all the
experiments it is clear that use of deception will speed the identification of an attacker
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which is very important in cybersecurity scenarios as different real-world attackers e.g.
APTs can lay low for a long time and detecting the attacker early can facilitate informed
decision making for the defender.

6.8

Scalability

In our current game model, the defender makes a move after considering the attacker’s
last known position and every possible way k honeypots can be allocated between two real
nodes in the network. Let’s define σ(i, j) as a slot where a honeypot can be allocated
between node i and node j. The current algorithm makes sure that node i is always one
hop distance away from the attacker’s last known position and node j does not include the
goal nodes to exclude trivial cases.
Using this approach the number of slots of σ(i, j) where k honeypots can be allocated
increases very quickly with both network size (branching factors) and k which makes the
algorithm not very scalable. For our initial experiments, we used a network of size 18. Now
we will present a simple heuristics that allows the algorithm to handle larger instances of
networks compared to our initial approach.

6.8.1

Heuristics

In the real world, sensors, intrusion detection systems and forensic analysis are used to
collect data and to analyze the alerts and to understand the TTP used by an attacker.
Utilizing the same tools and analytics it is also possible to form a belief on the approximate
time interval of the attacks of an attacker and his preferences towards different features of
the network, for example, OS, application, ports, hardware etc. Rather than just focusing
on TTP used by an attacker the defender can try to understand the attacker behavior which
drives the attacks and the attacker’s propagation throughout the network. If the defender
knows the last position of the attacker in the network, the time interval and preferences and
attacker behavior can be used to get an estimate on his future attacks in the network to
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form a radius from the last known position of the attacker to consider the slots for honeypot
allocation. Using these estimations on the attacker’s future positions in the network many
of the unnecessary slots also can be filtered out.
In our game model, we do not capture this complex behavior of attacker preferences,
behaviors, and interval of attacks. We simplify it by assuming that the defender knows
the attacker’s last position in each round and defender also knows that the attacker only
moves 1 hop per round. Using these assumptions the defender can consider slots σ(i, j)
where the distance between node i and node j is always 2 hops and node i is always 1 hop
away from the last known position of the attacker. It is also unnecessary to consider slots
σ(i, j) where node i and node j are only 1 hop away since it will only introduce costs to
the paths and we assume that the attacker chooses a path which minimizes his costs. More
unnecessary slots can be eliminated from considerations utilizing domain knowledge; for
example, the defender knows that the attacker only moves forward (which is not realistic)
however, this is one of our assumptions of the game model; as a result it is not necessary
to consider slots which are behind the attacker’s last known position.

6.9

Evaluation of Heuristics

Our goal is to evaluate the heuristics we used to reduce the number of possible ways
honeypots can be allocated in the network to make the algorithm more scalable compared
to our previous experiments. In the first experiment, we evaluate the solution quality of the
algorithm with and without heuristics by comparing how early the defender can identify an
attacker. We used different sizes of networks with different limits on the number of rounds
the players can play. Each of the three attackers we considered, a, b, c, has some unique and
some shared exploits in their possession. Attacker a has exploits φ0 , φ1 , φ2 . Attacker b has
φ2 , φ3 , φ1 . Attacker c has exploits φ4 , φ5 , φ2 . We picked the attacker b as the acting attacker.
We kept the edge density and shared vulnerabilities between nodes to 40%. Results are
averaged over 20 game instances. In the Figure 6.9, the first row, Figure 6.9a,6.9b computes
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(a) Solution quality without heuristics #nodes=(b) Solution quality without heuristics #nodes=
13

18

(c) Solution quality with heuristics #nodes= 13 (d) Solution quality with heuristics #nodes= 18

Figure 6.9: Comparison between algorithms without heuristics (first row) and with heuristics (second row). Edge density and shared vulnerabilities between nodes 40%
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Figure 6.10: Comparison between run times of the algorithms for different sizes of networks.
Edge density and shared vulnerabilities between nodes 40%
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the solution without using the heuristics and the second row, Figure 6.9c, 6.9d computes
the solution using the heuristics to reduce the action space. As we can see, the solution
quality did not degrade for the experiments we conducted. However, currently, we have no
proof to guarantee an optimal solution with the use of heuristics.
In the next experiment, we compare the run time between the algorithms using without
and with heuristics for different sizes of networks and the same setup as the previous
experiment. Run times are averaged over all the attackers for a particular size of games.
As shown in Figure 6.10, for smaller instances the algorithm with heuristics can compute
the solution much quicker than if we do not use any heuristics. For larger instances of
games if we do not heuristics the algorithm runs out of memory very quickly (as shown by
’x’) whereas using the heuristic we can compute the solutions.
The experiments above clearly show that if we reduce the action space, it is possible
to make the algorithms faster. That answers the research question 1: by revealing more
information to the defender it is possible to reduce action space for the defender. However,
there can be other ways to increase the scalability performance of the algorithms. For
example, we can reduce the graph itself to construct an abstracted version of the game.
However, we will consider that as our future work.

6.10

Conclusions

Detecting and identifying attackers is one of the central problems in cybersecurity, and
defensive deception methods such as honeypots have a key role to play, especially against
sophisticated adversaries. Identification is an even harder problem in many ways than
detection, especially when many attackers use similar tools and tactics in the early stages
of attacks. However, any information that can help to narrow down the goals and likely
tactics of an attacker can also be of immense value to the defender, especially if it is
available early on.
We present several case studies and a formal game model showing how we can use
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deception techniques to identify different types of attackers represented by the different
attack graphs they use in planning optimal attacks based on their individual goals and
capabilities. We show that strategically using deception can facilitate significantly earlier
identification by leading attackers to take different actions early in the attack that can be
observed by the defender. Our simulation results show this in a more general setting. In
future work we plan to explore more specifically how this type of information can be used to
respond dynamically to specific attackers during the later stages of an attack. We also plan
to investigate how this model can be extended to different types of deception strategies,
integration with other IDS techniques, as well as larger and more diverse sets of possible
attacker types.
Current test beds do not support the capabilities offered by game theoretic or ML
algorithms for dynamic deception. Moreover, there are current test beds also do not support
the evaluation of cyber deception algorithms. So, for my next chapter I present a testbed
that supports different capabilities offered by the game theoretic framework of dynamic
cyber deception where we can evaluate the effectiveness of a dynamic cyber deception
algorithm.
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Chapter 7
Evaluating Game Theory in Realistic
Cybersecurity Scenarios
7.1

Introduction

While scalable solution methods allow us to apply game theory to realistic problems, we
also need to validate that the models can capture realistic problem constraints and considerations, and produce useful results in real-world problems. This goes beyond evaluating
the algorithms themselves into considering the applicability of the models, evaluating their
assumptions, and testing them in more realistic settings.
Cyber deception using honeypots provide a unique way to maintain network security.
It lures an attacker from the real machines and gives a unique opportunity to look into
the techniques tactics and procedures used by an attacker. This opportunity (through new
intelligence) allows for improved IDS and IPS. However, previous approaches of utilizing
honeypots are static upon receiving any alerts, indicators, or any artifacts and does not take
into consideration that an attacker can observe and learn to predict the honeypots. Recently, dynamic deception strategies using Game Theory and Machine Learning have been
developed [39, 68] to defend against intelligent attackers which provides less predictable
honeypots, targeted honeypot allocation strategies, ability to manipulate an attacker and
improvement of honeypots.
However, applying these intelligent algorithms for dynamic deception strategies faces
unique challenges when we want to apply them in realistic settings e.g. the physical constraints of observation (monitoring) and dynamic allocation of honeypots. More specifically,
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effective monitoring of network traffic and hosts, delays introduced by honeypots, the effectiveness of deception, and many more. So, we must evaluate the Game Theoretic and
Machine Learning algorithms in a testbed that allows the action space required by the
algorithms and addresses the gap between the theory and practice. Moreover, the testbed
itself needs to be scalable, repeatable, accessible.
In this final chapter of my dissertation, I present an initial attempt to apply the game
theoretic model of the attacker identification project 6 into a realistic scenario using the
Cybersecurity Deception and Experimentation System (CDES)1 . The CDES testbed is an
extension of the Common Open Research Emulator that is an already established network
emulator. CDES is scalable, follows a modular design, and provides the opportunity to
integrate algorithms and other software that can be utilized for proper evaluation. Most
importantly it supports the capability of dynamic deception strategies required by the
Game Theory and Machine Learning algorithms. The experiment section shows that a
defender can use game theory to defend his network by identifying an attacker identity by
utilizing dynamic deception.
APT poses a serious threat to national security, infrastructure, society, economy, academia,
and even political campaigns [1]. APTs are usually sponsored by a nation-state to achieve a
mission goal. They are highly skilled with sophisticated capabilities [29] [17]. For example,
before launching an initial attack to the target they gather technical and people information
on the target organization to find weaknesses so that they can develop capabilities to infiltrate the system. Next, using the developed capabilities they launch the initial attack to
have a foothold in the target network. For initial access, an APT can also launch a Supply
Chain Attack [23, 7] that removes the necessity of phishing or drive-by attacks [25]. Once
an APT has a foothold inside a network it usually employs sophisticated TTP until the
mission goal is obtained. For example, an APT can use various defense evasive techniques
to fool the defense mechanisms [26]. They can learn by monitoring the network and collecting data from sensors and then modifying their executable using Artifact kit [9]. They
1
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can also learn the environment so that they build their own VMs where they test/emulate
their new attack capabilities to find the most effective strategy for the next attack [9].
An APT can persist without any detection in the target network for an extended period
of time. A defender must detect and identify an APT earlier in its life cycle since the
defender can make a better-informed decision. However, it is not straight forward since
many APT can employ similar TTP and they can buy the same tool-kits from the dark
web. As a result, even after detecting an APT the problem of identifying and stopping
an APT still could remain unsolved [39]. An APT can also impersonate [6, 5] or deploys
artifacts pro-actively to inhibit the forensic investigation. They may employ many defense
evasion techniques [15]. Adversaries may also mask their operations by leveraging whitelisted tools and protocols [118, 122]. Current approaches rely on detection during an attack
and detailed identification is done in a post forensic analysis. The industry also lacks the
use of pro-active measures to detect and identify an attacker earlier. Usually, most of the
process to observe and match behavior pattern to detect attacker activity can be difficult
due to the aforementioned reasons.
I present an operational game-theoretic model where the defender actions can facilitate
detailed attacker identification early in the attack cycle. The model we present is based
on the game theoretic model introduced in the work by Basak et al. [39]. When describing
the defender algorithm we also show that an effective NIDS, HIDS can reduce the action
space of the defender to make the game model scalable. We first give a summary of the
existing game-theoretic model, then we present the operational game model. Then we do
emulation experiments in the CDES testbed to show that the game theory can is used by
a defender to detect and identify an attacker earlier in the attack chain through dynamic
deception and manipulation of the attackers.
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7.2

CDES Testbed

The target sector of an APT can vary depending on its current mission goals [23, 7]. As
a result, a single type of network is not enough. If we want to test different capabilities
of a network against these intelligent attackers, we need a network that can support dynamic metamorphism into a necessary topology at that moment. The existing testbeds
are manually constructed depending on the need for the validation procedure [50]. It’s
time-consuming. Also, most of them are commercial so it is not open to the cybersecurity
community where lack of data is very prominent.
We tackle this issue by using the CDES testbed which can facilitate experiments to
operationally verify the defense capability of a heterogeneous network regardless of its
domain (e.g. military, ad-hoc, wireless, enterprise, university, etc.) that is autonomous,
self-sustained, resilient and pro-active. It is built upon already established CORE which
provides a real network environment. CDES allows its users repeatable experiments, integration of algorithms and software, and their modifications. It has a GUI for building
realistic network scenarios and interfaces for easy modification of different components of
its modules.

Figure 7.1: CDES Interfaces and Data Flow
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CDES has three main modules as shown in the Figure 7.1: CORE, instantiation manager, and conditional connection manager. The CORE provides the underlying emulation
environment. The instantiation manager loads a scenario and initiates every parameter of
that scenario provided by a user. This manager allows for the initiation of the controller
which has a monitor, a trigger, and a network swapper component which are part of the
conditional network manager. The monitor module collects traffic data and raises alerts
based on the NIDS and its rules. The trigger module keeps track of the alerts raised and
can make decisions based on the alerts. This is the module that can be used to integrate
artificially intelligent algorithms for dynamic deception strategies. The network swapper
module receives commands through API to dynamically change the honeypots and activate
or deactivates honeypots by sending messages to the CORE.
Besides early detection, and identification of APT using game theory this autonomous
dynamic property using game theory can open doors for many other possibilities. For
example, we can collect and publish data based on different emulations in CDES that
can be used by the community. We can also support the capability of reducing a load of
computation because of the vast amount of data by strategically selecting different parts
of a network to sense, collect, and compute using game-theoretic algorithms.

7.3

Moving to an Operational Game Theoretic Model

We now describe the factors we considered to transform a theoretic framework into an
operational one because in a theoretic model any aspect of a real-world computer network
is abstracted to make the model less cumbersome. However, it is not possible to make a
theoretic game model as complex as a real one. We discuss each of the components of the
game theoretic model and what we need to consider to transform it into an operational
game theoretic model.
The networks in the game theoretic model consist of nodes and edges. The topology
of the network is sufficient to represent many aspects of a real-world network. However, a
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real-world enterprise network is usually segmented into subnets, DMZs, internal networks,
external networks, and there can be firewalls and IDS, IPS, etc. which were not considered
in the previous work. The firewalls make it possible to segment the network into DMZ;
that means they control the network packet flow by blocking and allowing traffic flows
from different directions. In our operational game model, we consider these aspects of a
real-world computer network. We also consider IDS that acts as the situational awareness
module for the defender.
The game theoretic model has a set of attackers and one defender. Each of the attackers
has a set of exploits that they can use to move laterally from one node to another. The
attacker makes an attack plan (from the current node to the goal node) based on his AG
assuming that he knows the current topology of the network. However, in reality, different
firewalls will prevent an attacker from doing so unless the attacker has already compromised
all the nodes of the network or has done reconnaissance previously.
In the operational model, we break down the action of an attacker into more realistic
steps. First, the attackers need to scan the surrounding hosts and open ports. Then they
need to scan for vulnerable applications running on the open ports. We can think of these
scanning steps as the reconnaissance phase. After gathering necessary information the
attacker decides on which vulnerability to exploit on which host based on his preference
and objective. We also limited the attacker’s observation of the network based on firewalls.
So, we cannot assume that the attacker has complete knowledge about the topology of the
network. Since it is not realistic to construct an attack plan to the goal node from the
current node the attacker uses some other measurement to make his decision.
We used two metrics to evaluate available options for decision making of an attacker:
1) preference for using different exploits 2) level of alerts. That means an attacker uses his
preference for exploitation to move laterally. If there is a tie, he breaks the tie using the
inclination of raising minimum alerts. Instead of making an attack plan from the current
node to the goal node, an attacker uses his local observation and evaluation metrics to
decide for the current stage. We describe more about the attacker action space when we
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formally define the attacker for the operational model.
The theoretic model assumes that the defender can observe the attacker’s action until
the last round. Based on history he updates his belief and then deploys honeypot. In the
real world that does not happen. In the real world, the defender usually uses sensors in the
hosts and NIDS, HIDS to keep himself aware of the state of the network. However, this is
a hard task since there is legitimate traffic in the network and the inherent characteristics
of the network protocols prevent the defender from detecting the attacker activity easily.
For our operational model, we write rules to detect network traffic patterns which alert
on attacker scanning and exploitation activities. More about the defender’s observation
(detection) stage will be described in the next section.
Next, the defender deploys honeypots. To evaluate each honeypot configuration and
deployment settings the defender utilizes the attacker models. We also assume in the
operational model that the defender is aware of all the attacker models. This allows the
defender to measure the effectiveness of different honeypot deployments. In the game
theoretic model, the defender minimizes the overlapping length of the attackers’ attack
plans (based on the attack plan from the current node to the goal node). Since it is not
realistic we use the measurement of alerts and similarity between alerts to evaluate the
effectiveness of different honeypots. For example, if the defender will try to use such a
honeypot will reduce the alert similarities between the attackers which forces the attackers
to reveal more information about them.

7.4

Operational Model

Now we present the components of the operational game model. Since the capabilities of
an attacker can vary due to the existence of myriad available TTP, we use a case study
based operational model to show how the algorithm works. In our game model, we have
constructed two attackers with different preferences and different capabilities with some
similarities. The similarities between the attackers help to illustrate the importance of
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using a game theoretic approach to identify the acting attacker. First, we present the set of
exploits, tools all the attacker can use. Each attacker can have a subset of those capabilities
with a specific preference which we define manually in such a way that highlights the
effectiveness of the algorithm.

7.4.1

Capabilities and MITRE ATT&CK

All of the capabilities listed below fall into the technique category of Exploitation of Remote
Services technique which falls into the tactics category of lateral movement according to
the MITRE ATT&CK [26, 22]. In this technique an adversary exploits remote services to
gain access to a target machine after he already has a foothold inside the network. The
exploitation can occur because of remote software vulnerability which can be a bug or error
in the code or even in the OS which is exploited by the attacker to his advantage. However,
before the exploitation, an attacker needs to know if the remote system is vulnerable which
can be known by using different network scanning tools or penetration testing tools e.g.
Nmap, Metasploit [28] [24]. Below are some capabilities which can be used by an attacker
to exploit a remote system. When we say capability, that means if a remote system has
the corresponding vulnerability an attacker can use the capability to exploit the remote
vulnerability.
JBoss JBoss capability is used by an attacker to exploit a vulnerable remote JBoss service
with CVE-2007-1036. In this vulnerability, the default configuration of JBoss does not
prevent access to the console and web management interfaces, which allows remote
attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative access [14]. An attacker
can use the metasploit jboss invoke deploy module [21] to exploit the vulnerability.
War FTP War FTP capability is used to exploit a remote machine that is running a
vulnerable service with CVE-1999-0256 [12]. In this particular vulnerability, the
buffer overflow allows an attacker to execute remote code. The warftpd 165 user
module [32] in Metasploit can be used to exploit the vulnerability.
90

SQLMap SQLMap [30] is an open source penetration testing tool that allows an attacker
(or pen-tester) to discover SQL injection flaws and compromise a database server.
SSH This capability allows an attacker to exploit the CVE-1999-0502 [13] vulnerability
using the sshexec Metasploit module where the target machine has default password
set to null or blank for SSH. An attacker can connect with a valid user password to
execute a specified payload via SSH [31].
proxychain Proxychain [18] allows an attacker to tunnel his traffic through a compromised
machine’s meterpreter session (to bypass firewall). This technique can be used to
achieve nmap scanning or sql injection using sqlmap when the firewall is blocking the
traffic from the attacker’s current position. First, an attacker needs to establish a
meterpreter session with a machine that has access to the target machine. Then a
route is added to tunnel the traffic through the meterpreter session to the destined
subnet. Then a proxy server (in the local machine) is used to listen to the traffic
and route any traffic which is destined for the target subnet through the meterpreter
session. After that, the attacker can easily use a proxychain tool to perform any type
of remote exploit e.g. sqlmap.
Besides these capabilities, we assume that all the attackers can scan the network
using Nmap.

7.4.2

Environment

We use the Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) [11], a network emulator to model
our environment and to stage the attacker and defender interactions. Figure 7.2 shows
the network we used for our operational game model. It has two legit network subnets
LegitNet1, LegitNet2. An attacker can connect to the router n1. Then using his capabilities
he can compromise the legit networks one after another since to reach the LegitNet 2 an
attacker has to compromise the LegitNet 1 first. As you can see in Figure 7.2 there are
two decision points. On these two points, two honeynets are connected called Honeynet1,
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Figure 7.2: The network used for the emulated experiments
Honeynet2. The defender can activate different honeynet in those honeynets. Based on
the attacker activity we assume that the defender activates only one honeynet from each
of the honeynets sequentially. The objective of the defender is to lure the attacker into a
honeynet which will reveal more information about his identity.
Now we describe the network topology in Figure 7.2 in detail. The network can be
accessed from the outside via the 10.0.0.1/24 and 10.0.1.1/24 interface in the router n1.
After that, there is a router cn1. Then comes the first decision point (near the green colored
box) router n6 which has multiple interfaces connected to it. We named this router the
first decision point because we defined our operational game model as a two-step game and
this is the first point where the attacker and defender have to make a decision. A legit
network LegitNet 1 is connected to the first decision point router via the 10.0.4.1/24 network
interface. The LegitNet 1 has two machines in it. A workstation 10.0.4.11/24 and a ssh
server with ip 10.0.4.2/24. The ssh server is a separate virtual machine that is connected
to the network via a rj45 network interface adapter. This capability of connecting virtual
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machines through rj45 port makes the network topology more realistic.
The first decision point router also has honeynets called HoneyNets 1 connected to it in
the 10.0.7.1/24 interface. The HoneyNets 1 is connected via a decision node decnode1 which
can dynamically activate or deactivate connection towards each honeynet. We describe
more about the decision nodes in a separate section where the defender algorithms are
implemented. The HoneyNets 1 has three honey networks, ssh server, JBoss and Warftp.
Next, we have the second decision point router n24. This router has a firewall that only
accepts connection from the LegitNet 1. That means if an attacker wants to access beyond
the second decision point, he has to do that by tunneling his traffic via LegitNet 1 using a
meterpreter session.
The n24 router has e legit network LegitNet 2 connected to it in the 10.0.5.2/24 interface. The LegitNet 2 has workstation(10.0.14.11/24) and a webserver(10.0.14.100/24) with
mysql database. An attacker’s job is to compromise the webserver in the LegitNet 2. However, to prevent that the second decision point has HoneyNets 2 connected to the n24 router
via the 10.0.33.1/24 interface which is connected to a decision node called decnode2. HoneyNets 2 has three honey networks connected to the decnode2: a) Warftp(10.0.16.10/24),
b) JBoss(10.0.12.2/24) c) Webserver(10.0.11.100/24) with database. So, the honeypots are
in a separate network. The decnode2 can dynamically activate/deactivate the connection
to each of the honey networks in the HoneyNets 2. Same as before (except the ssh honeypot in HoneyNets 1) all the honeypots are connected via rj45 port which allows adding a
separate virtual machine to the network.

7.4.3

Attacker Agents

We considered two attackers for our operational game model. An attacker’s identity is
defined by his capabilities and preferences to decide on the next attack in a sequential game.
Each of the attackers has different and overlapping capabilities with each other. Same as
the game theoretic model each of the attackers follows their preference of capabilities when
making a decision. If there is a tie an attacker chooses the option which maximizes the
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alert similarity with other attackers. Here we are also assuming that the attacker models
are common knowledge.
We defined two attackers as ajboss and awf tp . Attacker ajboss has the following capabilities with preferences: JBoss(1), SQLMap(2), ssh(2). Attacker awf tp has the following
capabilities with preferences: warftp(1), ssh db(2), SQLMap(2). The number refers to their
preference where a smaller number has a higher priority. We also note that both of the
attackers have the proxychain capability besides their other capabilities where proxychain
is used to exploit vulnerabilities of target machines which need to be accessed via another
machine. This happens because of the firewall rules the defender has placed in the LegitNet
2 and HoneyNets 2 which prevents the attacker from accessing them directly. We have the
scripts for the attacker capabilities upload in a GitHub repository [10].

7.5

The Game Play

The defender uses an algorithm [39] to activate different honeypots instead of activating
them all at once and keeping them activated always. However, since we cannot use the
theoretical algorithm straight out of the box, we transform the algorithm to make it work in
the real world. The benefit of this algorithm is that it prevents the attacker from learning
about the true topology of the network and also forces the attacker to reveal his identity.
As you can see in Figure 7.2, there are two different decision points (decnoe1, decnode2)
where the defender makes his decision on which honeynet to activate. Initially all the
honeynets (HoneyNets 1, HoneyNets 2) are deactivated from the decision points (decnode1,
decnode2). An attacker is picked randomly between ajboss and awf tp . Before the attacker
starts his attack the defender makes his first move by activating a honeynet in HoneyNets
1. The decision is made in the decnode1 and will be described in detail in a later section.
After that, the attacker decides to attack a machine which he discovers by network scanning.
An attacker can use the scripts [10] to attack a machine. Since the defender activated a
honeynet from the Honeynets 1 (the attacker doesn’t know whether a machine is a honeypot
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or not) the attacker can either attack a machine in the LegitNet 1 or the activated honeynet
in Honeynets 1. If the attacker attacks a honeypot then the scenario ends. If not, then the
defender strategically activates a honeynet from the Honeynets 2, and the decision is made
by decnode2. And then the attacker makes his second decision. Like the previous stage if
he attacks a machine in the LegitNet 2 then he reaches his goal or he attacks a honeynet
in HoneyNets 2 then he gets caught and his identity is revealed. In our scenario, we
constructed the attackers in such a way that the honeypots will always attract an attacker
with its unique preference since the defender also strategically avoids using honeypots that
attracts both of the attackers.

7.6

Defender Decision Engine

Three primary aspects need to be added as a part of the defender of the operational game
model: a) sensing b) analysis of the traffic alerts raised by NIDS b) computing traffic
pattern or alert similarity between two attackers.
Sensing The sensing aspect is a missing component in the theoretic model. In the operational model, we need the defender to have the sensing capability to have a visual on
the current state of the network. Sensing can be done using different NIDS and HIDS.
In our current model, we considered suricata NIDS. The rules used in the NIDS are
generated by a tool called packet annotation [8] which automatically generates rules
for NIDS based on supervised training. We also assume that the alerts raised by the
NIDS have no error and give perfect information on an attacker’s current position.
However, this does not mean that the defender was able to stop the attacker. We
assume that an attacker is stopped only when he gets into a honeypot.
Alert analysis The defender needs to analyze the alerts raised by the NIDS to have a
visual on what is the current state of the network. The analysis of the alerts gives the
defender directions on different events taking place in the network. Usually, alerts
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are further analyzed by network security engineers to be investigated. However, our
purpose is to use the alerts by the autonomous algorithm so that it can understand
what is the current status of the attacker. I just want to remind the readers that
even if the attacker is detected using NIDS doesn’t mean it’s been identified. The
goal of our work is to use the autonomous algorithm to identify an attacker as early
as possible.
Alert similarity The defender decision engine needs to compute the alert similarity between the attackers. This is one of the most crucial components of our operational
model. Since in most situations an attacker cannot compute an attack path to a
goal node which is more than 1 hop away due to firewall and other network security
barriers, the attackers will not be able to compute attack path overlapping with one
another. So, we had to transform the idea of computing attack path similarity to
alert similarity. Whereas an attacker tries to increase the alert similarities with other
attackers the defender wants to minimize the alert similarity. The alert similarity
between two attackers can be computed by taking the summation of differences of all
the features between two alerts. Since there can be multiple alerts raised by traffic
activities, the feature values need to be computed for some time. We have used an
already developed system which can raise alerts on attacker’s current position and
activity. That means we assume that our NIDS is a perfect system: the defender
has a perfect observation on the attacker activities except he does not know which
attacker he is currently facing.
We simplified the complexity of the traffic pattern and alert matching by assuming
that the alerts are different unless the attackers use the same exploit which can happen
since attackers can have similar exploits. We plan to extend the complexity in the future
where there can be legitimate traffic and imperfect NIDS. Now that we have described the
necessary background we present our game theoretic algorithm [39].
In each decision point, the algorithms run as a separate entity. We made it sequential;
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that means the decnode1 makes a decision first, then the decnode2 makes its decision based
on the activity of the attacker in the first decision point. In the decnode1 the algorithm
computes the alert similarities between attackers for every deployment of honeynets. Then
he chooses to activate the honeynet which resulted in the minimum alert similarity between
the attackers. If there are two honeynet deployment settings with similar alert similarity
then the defender takes into account a weighted alert similarity where the weights keep
track of the success history of different honeynets. Once the decision has been made the
algorithm instructs to activate the connection of that honeynet. Next, we describe the
structure of the whole system and how the defender’s decision engine fits into the as a
module. And we describe how the decision engine itself has been implemented. The code
of the decision engine is implemented as a part of the CDES [2, 3].

7.7

Results

For our experiment, we want to show that the defender can strategically deploy dynamic
honeynets based on the alerts he receives to identify an attacker earlier in its attack stage.
We use the CDES [] to run our experiments. We developed a case study based experiments.
If we want to use the algorithm in some other network, the attackers have to be built on the
existing vulnerabilities in the network. Now we move forward with the experiment using
the network 7.2.
We assume that the attacker already has a foothold inside the network. As the figure
shows the network has an entry point at router n1, where an attacker can be connected
from the outside world through the 10.0.0.1/24 interface and start his post-exploitation
activities. The network has two decision point decnode1, decnoe2 which are connected to
router n6 and n24 respectively. The router n6 has a LegitNet 1 and Honeynets 1 connected
to it. In both of the decision point, the defender makes the first move and then the attacker
makes his move.
In our experiment, we try to show how the defender makes a strategic decision if dif-
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(a) ajboss attack propagation without deception (b) awf tp attack propagation without deception

Figure 7.3: Attack propagation without deception
ferent attackers with overlapping capabilities attack. We focus on the defender’s capability of making a strategic decision to reduce similarities between possible future alerts
raised by different attackers which helps to identify an attacker. We defined two attackers as ajboss and awf tp . Attacker ajboss has the following capabilities with preferences:
JBoss(1), SQLMap(2), ssh(2). Attacker awf tp has the following capabilities with preferences: warftp(1), ssh db(2), SQLMap(2). The number refers to their preference where a
smaller number has a higher priority. Both of the attacker’s goal is the webserver(10.0.14.100/24)
in the LegitNet 2.
For our first experiment, we do not use any deception strategy for attacker identification.
Figure 7.3a and Figure 7.3b show the attack propagation in the network for the ajboss and
awf tp attackers respectively. We assume that the defender ignores the IP address associated
with the attacker’s network traffic. We observe that both of the attackers follow the same
attack plan which makes them indistinguishable.
In the decnode1 the defender activates the wftp and jboss honeynets with uniform distribution since both of the honeypots raises same minimum alerts. The code for the decision
making algorithm has uploaded in a GitHub repository [2] [3]. For both cases, as shown in
Figure 7.4a 7.4b, the attacker is caught at honeypots which are earlier than the webserver
in the LegitNet 2. Another observation is that we cannot use hop distance as a metric to
measure the effectiveness of the deception strategies as the deployment of honeypot can
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(a) ajboss attack propagation with deception

(b) ajboss attack propagation with deception

Figure 7.4: Attack propagation with deception for the attacker ajboss

(a) awf tp attack propagation with deception

(b) awf tp attack propagation with deception

Figure 7.5: Attack propagation with deception for the attacker awf tp
have longer hop distance from the attacker’s current point. Similarly Figure 7.5a 7.5b show
that the attacker awf tp is caught at an earlier point before the webserver in the LegitNet 2.
Since the operational model does not use hop distance to measure the effectiveness
of strategic cyber deception, for now, we just make sure that the attacker is not able to
reach his goal node webserver in the LegitNet 2. Figure 7.6a and Figure 7.6c shows the
effectiveness of using strategic cyber deception technique. Figure 7.6b and Figure 7.6d
shows if use of strategic cyber deception is effective. We can observe that because of
strategic cyber deception, the ajboss attacker was not able to reach his goal node whereas
without any cyber deception the two attackers (ajboss , awf tp ) plan become indistinguishable.
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(a) Identification of attacker c without decep-(b) Indistinguishable network propagation by
tion

two attackers

(c) Identification of attacker c with deception

(d) Early identification of attacker ajboss

Figure 7.6: Comparison of results between the game theoretic framework and the operational model
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7.8

Conclusions

We have presented our first attempt on building an operational game theoretic model in
the cyber domain where the defender strategically allocates honeynets to reveal the identity
of an attacker at an early stage of its life cycle. We have taken the game theoretic model
from Chapter 6 and transformed it into an operational model that works in the real world.
However, it has some limitations; there is no legit traffic, the attacker is naive, the NIDS
is perfect. For the future, we plan to incorporate features into the game model to handle
these complexities. In the next chapter, I summarize my contributions and discuss future
works.
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Chapter 8
Looking Back and Moving Forward
8.1

Summary and Future Work

As I look back to when I have started my research on developing scalable algorithms
in the decision making domain, I can not help but think that the scalability problem is
still a very significant problem both in academia and industry. Whereas the industry
tries to focus more on adhoc solutions by leveraging the state of the art technological
advancements, academia focuses more on the theoretical part of the problem. I like to
think that both of the throngs are important and complement each other. For example, in
the industry, it’s possible to utilize the quantum property of objects or physical property of
an object to bypass the temporal distance between computation. The theoretical spearhead
however focuses more on the algorithmic part within physical constraints. The problem
is so significant that there is a framework to save the advancement of the research: P,
NP problems since much past research were not able to solve the issue completely but the
research needs to be preserved and utilized.
The focus of my research is more on the algorithmic part of a game-theoretic model that
analyses the decision making of intelligent agents in a network environment. In this case, the
algorithm needs to iterate over all of the action space. However, the action space increases
exponentially to the size of the representation of the underlying network. My primary
research question spearheads the idea of exploiting the characteristics of the underlying
network in a game theoretic model to abstract the action space in an intelligent fashion. I
present multiple research questions in different domains where the research questions are
tied back to my primary research question.
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The first game theoretic model I present is GSG. In this game model, the patrollers
try to protect wildlife and natural resources from environmental crimes by following a
patrolling path. Due to the graph representation of a large physical terrain the growth of
patrolling paths increases exponentially. However, the animals in a large area are sparse
and the poachers tend to be more active where there is high wildlife activity. So, I introduce
the research question 1 in page 2: how can we exploit the sparsity of animal activity in
the graph in GSG to achieve an abstracted game model?. I introduce a Double Oracle
algorithm combined with graph contraction that incrementally adds high wildlife activity
areas and patrolling paths to an abstracted game model until the attacker attacks in the
abstracted game. The experiments show approximately 99.6% improvements on runtime
over the baseline algorithm with an approximately 6% shift in the solution quality from
the optimal solution.
The next game-theoretic model I present is based on a cyber defense scenario using an
NFG where a defender uses automated NIDS/HIDS to stop a bot that propagates through
a network with subnets. It is hard to solve an NFG for real-world scenarios because enumerating all possible strategies results in an extremely large game because the large number
of hosts and interconnections in an enterprise network can lead to intractable NFG models.
However, since I assume that the network has subnets and due to network segmentation it
is difficult for a bot to spread across subnets, I answer the research question 1 in page 2 :
Can we use network decomposition utilizing the subnet structure to obtain a high-quality
scalable NFG?. I present an abstraction algorithm called Subgame Abstraction and Solution Concept (SASC) which utilizes the partially independent subgame structures in an
NFG to achieve a highly scalable game model. I also introduced an iterative version of the
algorithm (ISASC) that adjusts the noise outside the subgames of an AIOS game. The
experiments show that using network decomposition the ISASC can solve huge NFG within
seconds.
Next, I introduce a game-theoretic framework that represents the interaction between
an APT and a defender where the objective of the APT is to reach his goal machine by
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hiding his identity. The defender wants to reveal the identity of the APT and stop it by
pro-actively strategically using deception. However, when the defender wants to deploy
deception he needs to iterate all the honeypot deployment settings in all the places possible
in the network. As a result, the action space increases exponentially with the size of
the network. In this work I explore the research question 1 in page 5; whether revealing
more information to the defender can reduce the action space. Our experiments show that
information reveal can help to predict the next location of the attacker; and the defender
can further reduce the action space to make the game model more scalable.
In the next project, I introduced different physical constraints of a realistic computer
network to my last project. Due to the constraints, the previous game model needed to
be transformed into a realistic one. As a result, instead of computing attack paths, the
attacker utilized alert levels to make decisions. However, for the defender, the problem
of iterating over action space remains. In this work, I answer the research question 1 in
page 5; whether NIDS can be utilized to reduce the action space of the defender. As my
first attempt, I used the packet annotation tool [] and NIDS [] to determine the attacker
location that consequently reduces the action space that needs to be considered to make
the strategic decision of deploying deceptions in the network.
Finally, my observation is that exploiting the characteristics of a network to reduce the
action space resulted in very scalable algorithms in different domain of the game theoretic
models. However, some limitations could be improved. For example, I worked only with
perfect observation games and did not include any uncertainty. In the future, I would like
to incorporate these features if I get the opportunity.

8.2

Future Work

The attacker identification project has three major components: 1) agent modeling 2) situational awareness 3) early detection and identification of an attacker using game-theoretic
algorithms and Adversarial ML utilizing dynamic deception.
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Modeling an Advanced Threat is challenging because it is a combination of human
and malware. In the industry, there are very few resources to emulate an APT. Caldera
is one of them which utilizes the MITRE ATT&CK database. However, it only follows
a heuristic-based decision based on pre and postconditions, it does not consider defender
actions into consideration. We want to build an APT emulator which can be utilized
to evaluate different APT detection, identification mechanisms, and algorithms for cyber
defense. We approach this problem by utilizing the field of Knowledge Representation and
Reasoning (KRR) which focuses on designing computer representations of knowledge.
In the real world, in the red team and blue team exercises the blue team tries to
reconstruct the timeline for the red team’s attacks. If there is any gap in the attacker
activity timeline due to a lack of sensor placements in the network, the network analysts
manually make the decisions. For situational awareness purpose, I can use off the shelf
tools like the components of Security Onion e.g. Sguil for network intrusion detection and
wazuh for host intrusion detection. There is also the problem of processing a huge amount
of traffic and event data. However, using the game-theoretic algorithm I am working on,
it is possible to strategically activate sensors in different parts of the network based on the
current alerts. This way not only early detection will happen due to honeypots but also
we can reduce the load of a huge amount of data and events collected by the sensors.
The game-theoretic algorithm will observe the alerts provided by the sensors placed in
the system and will strategically deploy dynamic honeypots to identify the active APT
earlier. We can extend the game model in different ways. The first attempt would be to
model this with a DNN to represent sequential decision making and using RL to retrain
parts of the DNN. The defender can utilize the causal relation between the alerts and the
attacker activities in the strategic decision making of revealing the identity of an attacker.
The DNN with the RL can help with the pattern matching of traffic and strategic decision
making. Another idea would be to use a Monte Carlo Search Tree to find the best decision
in each round.
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